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Abstract:  The  following  report  provides  an  in-depth,  empirically  focused,  overview  of
contentious  mobilization  dynamics  before  and  during  the  Syrian  Uprising.  The  report
describes the period between the beginning of Bashar al-Assad’s rule in 2000 until the end
of 2012. Instead of an extensive chronological overview, the report is structured along a
thematic  “periodization”.  It  therefore  focuses  on  a  limited  number  of  key  issues  and
transformative events in the development of Syrian contentious mobilization.
The report argues that two aspects stand out in the Syrian case of Arab Spring mobilization.
First, the importance of societal structures in defining options available to both protesters
and the regime. Second, the importance of cognitive signaling (the resonance of a certain
event on a population, sometimes referred to as “thin diffusion”) at key turning points in the
uprising.  Both  the  social  structures  and  cognitive  signaling  were  crucial  in  defining
(perceived) possible avenues for contestation before and during the uprising.
Keywords : Syria, Arab Spring, Contentious Mobilization
Introduction
Who would have thought it? At the end of 2010 Syrian politics had weathered a
number  of  crises  under  leader  Bashar  al-Asad,  in  power  since  June  2000.
Through a combination of changes in the international political arena, domestic
patronage and old-fashioned repression, the regime seemed stronger than it had
been since 2000. So when a poor Tunisian fruit-seller set off the “Arab Spring”
by setting himself alight, many in- and outside Syria thought the country would
prove to be impervious to this wave op popular contention.1 They would be
proven wrong. In March 2011, in the southern city of Dara', an uprising began
1 See for instance the article by Haddad in Syria Comment (Haddad 2011) in which he makes the case as to why 
Syria will not be next “for now”. The article was published 4 days before the start of the uprising. 
that is ongoing at the time of writing in November 2012. 
The dynamics of the uprising have altered significantly over these initial
20 months.  From largely  peaceful  protests  (that  were immediately  repressed
using  live  ammunition  by  police)  to  a  full-blown  civil  war  in  which  an
increasing amount of heavily armed and well trained cadres of army defectors,
regular Syrian and foreign fighters are staging an armed insurrection against the
regime of Bashar al-Asad. Unable to repress the uprising effectively, the regime
has  gradually  come  to  use  more  crude  and  violent  methods  of  repressing
dissent. At present random bombings of civilian quarters by fighter jets are a
daily occurrence in various parts of the country. The uprising has taken on an
increasingly  sectarian  tone,  pitting  the  Sunni  majority  against  the  Alawi
minority, and has shown the lengths to which the regime and its supporters will
go to secure their survival. 
This  report  discusses  contentious  mobilization  in  Syria  from  the
beginning of Bashar’s rule in 2000 until  the end of 2012. The report has an
empirical  focus  and analyses  of  the  dynamics  of  the  uprising  are  kept  to  a
minimum. I provide an overview of the structural background to the uprising,
key actors in both elites and civil society and protests emerging in Syria both
before and during the uprising. Concerning the latter, due to the complexity and
duration  of  the  uprising,  space  and  time  do  not  allow  for  any  extensive
chronological overview. Instead, I opt for a “periodization” that is much more
thematic in nature and only broadly chronological. This means that not every
protest will be discussed, but I have attempted to focus on a few key issues and
transformative  events  before  and  during  the  uprising.  The  resulting  report
provides a broad introduction to the relevant structures, actors and dynamics of
the Syrian uprising up to November 2012.  
Two aspects stand out in the Syrian case. First, the political regime was,
and  is,  structurally  strong  before  and  throughout  the  uprising.  The  (elite)
political context had no influence, it would seem, on the start of the uprising,
nor  on  its  subsequent  dynamics.  More  obvious  structural  influences  on  the
dynamics  of  the  uprising  came from societal  structures  that  defined options
available to both protesters and the regime. Second, the importance of cognitive
signaling (the resonance of a certain event on a population, sometimes referred
to  as  “thin  diffusion”)  at  key  turning  points  in  the  uprising  can  hardly  be
overstated,  especially  at  its  start  and concerning the eventual  use  of  violent
repertoires. As we will see, both social structures and cognitive signaling were
crucial  in  defining  (perceived)  possible  avenues  for  contestation  before  and
during the uprising. 
Periodization
I subdivide the uprising into four periods, differentiated on the use of specific
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protest repertoires and (in the case of the last phase) geographical influence on
the uprising. These phases are defined by dates, but in reality are much more
gradual  than  this  chronology  might  imply.  In  Appendix  C  the  gradation  is
marked by different shades of gray. The different periods that are identified are: 
 Phase 0: Pre-uprising, approximately from 2000 to March 2011. Marked
by the absence of large scale public protest to Bashar's rule. At various
points, for instance during the “Damascus Spring” (2001), the Kurdish
uprising  (2004)  and  the  Sadnaya  prison  uprising  (2008)  contentious
mobilizations did occur, but all were localized and/or lacked open forms
of contention. Differing in their scale and use of protest strategies, none
of these instances were directly related to the outbreak of the uprising in
2011. 
 Phase 1: Peaceful domestic uprising, approximately March 2011 to June-
August 2011. Marked by peaceful street protests, attempts at staging sit-
ins and encampments in public squares. Use of live ammunition by the
police and (to a limited extent) the army to disperse protests. The main
protests took place in the cities of Homs and Idlib, involving hundreds of
thousands  of  protesters.  Demands  quickly  changed  from political  and
security  sector  reform to the end of  the regime.  Some influence from
foreign sheikhs observable, but the uprising itself remained overtly non-
religious.
 Phase  2:  Increasingly  violent  repertoires,  approximately  June-August
2011 to July 2012. This phase is defined by the increased used of violent
repertoires  on  the  side  of  the  protesters. In  response  to  increasing
repression (Homs was first shelled in May 2011) and the success of the
Libyan uprising in August of the same year, the perception that armed
insurrection was the only means to challenge the Bashar regime gained
traction in the Syrian opposition. Eventually, internal discussions on the
use  of  violent  means  became  irrelevant  as  more  and  more  militias
emerged  in  practice  and  violence  increased.  Over  time  the  militias
became more organized and unified, but attempts at creating a unified
“Free Syrian Army” (FSA) continued to lack legitimacy (and influence)
on the ground. 
 Phase 3: Full Civil War and Increasing Foreign Influence, approximately
July 2012 to Present. At the start of the uprising Syrians were explicitly
opposed  to  foreign  intervention  and  attempted  to  retain  the  domestic
characteristic of the uprising. Over time this tendency faded. Starting with
the  foreign  Syrian  councils  “representing”  the  uprising,  this  trend
developed with countries directly supporting the rebels with weapons and
money, and the conflict spilling over into Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan.
The  internationalization  of  the  conflict  is  mirrored  in  the  increased
coordination  of  militias  in  the  name  of  a  “Free  Syrian  Army”  and
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demands for foreign intervention (specifically concerning a no-fly zone
and the supply of heavy weaponry) among protesters. 
Protests 
In this section I follow the periodization as outlined above. In each period the
main protests are outlined and their size and protest repertoire discussed. The
protests are organized by who or what is organizing the protests. In Appendix C
an overview is  included of  main  protest  events  (including aims,  organizers,
number of protests, duration, and repertoires used) and crucial transformative
events.  Appendix  C  also  provides  a  more  elaborate  reference  list  (mostly
English,  but  also  Arabic  and  French)  of  newspaper  articles  covering  these
protests  and  a  graphical  reference  to  how  the  various  phases  overlap.
Additionally, appendix A provides a map of Syria as the following account often
refers to specific cities, towns and regions in the country. 
Phase 0: Pre-uprising, the elite opposition (2000-2001)
The beginning of  Bashar  al-Asad's  presidency seemed to herald a  period of
relative freedom after the strict autocratic rule of his father. In his inauguration
speech he apparently implied the introduction of some political liberalization
(Ghadbian 2001),  and some practical  political  changes were introduced.  The
result was the so-called ``Damascus Spring'' (2001): a time of relative political
freedom during which a political elitist opposition took shape. This opposition
became institutionalized in so-called forums – often no more than discussion
groups held at the discussions leader's house – that emerged across the country,
but most specifically in Damascus. Many of the more important forums were
led by a small number of Syrian intellectuals, for instance Riad Saif, Michel
Kilo and Riad al-Turk (ICG 2004, 8). The numbers of people that actually took
part in these forums was probably less than one thousand, as most organizations
were built around specific personalities and distrust between opposition figures
was endemic. Apart from public discussion forums a number of key declarations
were also published, but hardly any open protests were organized (an exception
was a May 8 2004 sit-in at the Syrian parliament).2 After calls for far reaching
democratic reforms were published at the beginning of 2001,3 mobilization was
suppressed (Zisser  2005,  62).  Key actors  found themselves  being arrested –
often repeatedly.4 
2Arabic News. “Damascus: Demonstrators Detained Before the Syrian Parliament”, March 9, 2004. 
http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/040309/2004030903.html. 
3After a first manifesto (signed by 99 activists) was published in the al-Hayat newspaper on September 26, 
2001, there were calls by Riad Saif for the establishment of a new liberal party on January 26. In February pres-
ident Bashar al-Asad started to give signals that political liberalizations were going to end (see Ghadbian 2001, 
636–637). 
4Riad Saif was arrested in 2001 and spent 5 years in prison. In January 2008 he would be arrested again. Michel 
Kilo was arrested in May 2005 and sentenced to three years imprisonment. (Landis and Pace 2007). Riad al-
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Despite increased repression following the Damascus spring of 2001, the
earlier groups of activists and dissidents remained organized and active, albeit
to  a  slowly  diminishing  extent.5 The  opposition  was  reinvigorated  in  direct
reaction  to  the  political  upheaval  that  followed  the  assassination  of  former
Lebanese President Rafiq Hariri in February 2005, though not this time through
public  forums,  as  these  were  increasingly  curtailed,  but  through  public
declarations instead. On 18 October 2005 (five days before the UN published a
report  on  the  Hariri  Murder)  the  “Damascus  Declaration”  was  published
demanding an end to the security state and political liberalization.6 The most
important part of this statement was that it was the first credible attempt to unify
Syrian  opposition  movements  (including  the  recently  emboldened  Kurdish
movements,  see  below)  and  to  start  an  open  dialogue  with  the  Muslim
Brotherhood (Landis and Pace 2007). When the opposition demanded improved
relations with a fully independent Lebanon following the Syrian departure from
that country, a wave of severe repression followed.7
The Kurdish Uprising (2004)
In the context of the fall of Saddam Hussein and the increased liberty of Iraqi
Kurds, Kurds in Syria sensed new opportunities and hoped for more freedoms
in the future. These hopes were dashed after a March 2004 soccer match in the
(majority Kurdish) town of Qamishli turned violent. Apparently, supporters of
the opposing team hurled insults about Öcalan, the then recently arrested leader
Turk was jailed for 30 months in 2001 but released early due to health reasons (ICG 2004 fn. 54). Many others 
have had similar experiences. For internal schisms within these elite political oppositions during this period, see:
راــــــبخأ ,ةيجراخ فحص ىلإ نييروسلا نيفقثملا ةقيثو بيرستب انئجوف :«طسولا قرشلا» ـل وليك لاشيم”, January 16, 2001. 
http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=8085&article=21803&search=%D3%E6%D1%ED
%C7&state=true. 
5On the increased repression see: New York Times. “Syria: More Dissidents Sentenced.” New York Times, Au-
gust 29, 2002. http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/29/world/world-briefing-middle-east-syria-more-dissid-
ents-sentenced.html?ref=syria. And an example of post-Damascus spring institutionalization, the founding of a 
league for the defense of prisoners of conscience: as-Sharq al-Awsat. “ىـــــلولا ,«يأرلا يلقتعم» نع عافدلل ةيروس ةنجل.” 
as-Sharq al-Awsat, January 15, 2002. http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?
section=1&issueno=8449&article=82714&search=%D3%E6%D1%ED%C7&state=true. Another example 
(from 2004): Arabic News. “700 Syrian Activists Demand the Government Reforms”, February 4, 2004. 
http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/040204/2004020411.html. Razuq al-Ghawi ( “ .(يواغلا قوزر17 ابزح 
راــــــبخأ ,تايرحلا نع عافدلا ناجل سيئر نع جارفلاب بلاطي انايب عقوت اضراعم ايروس.” as-Sharq al-Awsat, April 28, 2004. 
http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=9283&article=231147&search=%D3%E6%D1%ED
%C7&state=true. From 2005: Razuq al-Ghawi ( “ .(يواغلا قوزر12,تايرحلا نع عافدلل ةنجل سسؤت صخرم ريغ ايروس اميظنت 
ىـــــلولا.” as-Sharq al-Awsat, January 21, 2005. http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?
section=1&issueno=9551&article=278612&search=%D3%E6%D1%ED%C7&state=true. 
6Arabic News. “New Opposition Coalition in Syria for Comprehensive Change”, October 17, 2005; 
http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/051017/2005101717.html. ; Damascus Declaration. “ ينطولا سلجملا
يطارقميدلا ينطولا رييغتلا لجأ نم قشمد نلعل (Damascus Declaration) .doc”, December 1, 2007. 
7Landis, Joshua. “Michel Kilo the Patriot.” SyriaComment.com, May 15, 2006. http://faculty-
staff.ou.edu/L/Joshua.M.Landis-1/syriablog/2006/05/michel-kilo-patriot.htm.; as-Sharq al-Awsat. “ لاقتعا :ةيروس
ىـــــلولا ,نانبل عم ةقلعلا «بيوصت» نايب دعب وليك لاشيم بتاكلا.” as-Sharq al-Awsat, May 16, 2006. http://www.aawsat.-
com/details.asp?section=1&issueno=10031&article=363449&search=%D3%E6%D1%ED%C7&state=true. In 
2007 Al-Bunni was tried: as-Sharq al-Awsat. “  نجسلاب ينبلا رونا يروسلا ضراعملا ىلع مكحلا5راــــــبخأ ,تاونس .” as-Sharq
al-Awsat, April 25, 2007. http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?
section=4&issueno=10375&article=416539&search=%D3%E6%D1%ED%C7&state=true. 
8
of the (Turkish) Kurdish PKK party. Riots started and the police responded by
firing  into  the  Kurdish  crowds.8 In  reaction  riots  turned  into  broad  based
protests. Hundreds of thousands reportedly protested against regime repression
and demanded more Kurdish freedoms (Landis and Pace 2007, 53–54).9 The
uprising  was harshly  repressed:  according to  Amnesty  Internation 36 people
died, 200 were wounded and probably around 2000 arrested. Many of the latter
were tortured (Amnesty International 2005). Though protests mostly took place
in the north-eastern (Kurdish) part of the country, some protests also took place
in Aleppo and Damascus.10
Islamic Social Mobilization
As a reaction to the international isolation that followed the 2005 assassination
of former  president  Rafiq Hariri,  combined with the emboldened opposition
movement,  the regime turned to  a  more  conservative  force  in  society  in  an
apparent attempt to both support a conservative counter-movement and shore up
the religious credentials of the Bashar regime. In a speech at the University of
Damascus in November 2005 the President stated that “Suria Allah Hamiha”
(Syria, God Protects her).11 It signaled a willingness on the side of the regime to
allow a religious basis to Syrian nationalism, as long as this was within the
confines  of  Asad’s  rule.  A  surge  in  Islamic  mobilization  followed:  most
noticeably in various dawa' related (educational) activities.12 A main example is
the women’s movement around Munira al-Qubaysi,  the so-called Qubaysyat.
The  movement  is  specifically  aimed  at  empowering  women  within  a
8Amnesty International. “Syria: Kurds in the Syrian Arab Republic One Year After the March 2004 Events”, 
March 10, 2005. http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE24/002/2005. 
9KurdWatch. Who Is the Syrian-Kurdish Opposition? European Center for Kurdish Studies, December 1, 2011. 
http://www.google.it/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=kurdwatch%20who%20is%20the%20syrian%20kurdish
%20opposition&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved=0CC4QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fkurdwatch.org%2Fp-
df%2Fkurdwatch_parteien_en.pdf&ei=cx62UMXKOMLZtAbd54HAAg&usg=AFQjCNFr0hnE8wRqEuDy-
oqocPjjYJqsEZA 
10 See for instance: “  حارس قلطإ70راــــــبخأ ,قشمدو بلحو يلشماقلاب بغشلا ثداوح يف نيلقتعملا نم ايروس ايدرك ”, June 3, 2004.
http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=9319&article=237429&search=%D3%E6%D1%ED
%C7&state=true
11 See for the complete text of the speech: Razuq al-Ghawi and Bashar al-Asad. “ يروسلا سيئرلا باطخل لماكلا صنلا
راــــــبخأ ,قشمد ةعماج جردم ىلع دسلا راشب.” as-Sharq al-Awsat (November 11, 2005). http://www.aawsat.com/de-
tails.asp?section=4&issueno=9845&article=332856&search=%D3%E6%D1%ED%C7&state=true. For a (pro-
regime) reaction to the speech see: al-Wadi, Ahmad. “Syria, God Protects Her (Op-ed)”, November 11, 2005. 
http://thawra.alwehda.gov.sy/_kuttab_a.asp?FileName=48996323820051110223605. The resurgence of Islam 
had already emerged before to some extent, mainly in the context of the war in Iraq and the war on terror in gen-
eral. For a short note see: New York Times. “Syria, Long Ruthlessly Secular, Sees Fervent Islamic Resurgence.”
New York Times, October 24, 2003. http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/24/world/syria-long-ruthlessly-secu-
lar-sees-fervent-islamic-resurgence.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
12To give a sense of the size of the religious educational sphere in Syria, Zisser (2005, 49) quotes Syrian sources 
in al-Hayat newspaper stating that the number of religious schools in Syria in 2004 was 120, excluding 20 reli-
gious institutions or study centers. About 25,000 students studied in these schools. But these figures exclude in-
formal religious schools, which– according to various sources – blossomed throughout the early 2000s. Whereas
formal religious schools are under the supervision of the regime, informal schools are not. The religious school 
of the late Ahmad Kuftaru, the Abu Nur association, and Islamic studies center of Mohammad al-Habbash are 
two examples, but institutes are present throughout the country.
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conservative  Islamic  framework,  through  education  and  informal  discussion
groups, for instance by emphasizing the role of women at home. The Lebanese
journalist Ibrahim Hamidi stresses that the Qubaisiaat (The followers of Munira
al-Qubaisa)  are  not  concerned  only  with  teaching  but  also  with  (political)
influence through societal change (ICG 2004, 15–16).13 In 2006 the movement
apparently had tens of thousands of followers, mainly in Syria but also abroad.14
Fearing their increased power, in 2008 a wide ranging campaign was reported
where  dozens  of  Islamic  charitable  associations  were  pacified.15 Islamic
teaching institutes would soon follow.16
Salafist Jihadi groups
In this context the Salafist Jihadi groups should also be noted. Throughout the
period 2003-2009 several (violent) events related to these groups took place, but
in  all  instances  it  is  unclear  whether  there  was  (some  form  of)  regime
involvement (Landis and Pace 2007).17 In 2005, for instance, there was a shoot
out with “terrorists” in the up-maket neighborhood of Mezze. A few years later
there was a shoot out with Jihadists on Mount Qasioun, which overlooks the
13Hamidi, Ibrahim. “They Wear the Dark Blue Veil and Have a Wide Network for Teaching and Influence… 
‘The Misses of al-Qubaysiyat’ Are the Entrepreneurs in Syria for Involvement of Women in the ‘Islamic 
Da’wa’ ... With the Consent of the Authorities”, May 3, 2006. See also: al-Arabia.net. “‘ ةيملسإ ةكرح ’تايسيبقلا
 نع ندزي اهتاوضع ةضماغ ةيئاسن70افلأ ‘ (’The Qubaisiaat – a Secretive Female Islamic Movement That Has More 
Than 70 Thousand Followers").” al-Arabia.net, March 5, 2006. For an English language article (but less de-
tailed) see: Katherine Zoepf. “Islamic Revival in Syria Is Led by Women.” New York Times (August 29, 2006). 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/29/world/middleeast/29syria.html?_r=1&oref=slogin. 
14Ibid. 
15Levant News. “ةيعامتجلاو ةيريخلا تاايعمجلا ةرزجم يف‘ ةيروسلا تاطلسلا رارمتسا دكؤي نوطشان’ (Activists Confirm That the 
Syrian Authorities Continue ‘the Massacre of Charities and Social Organizations’)”, December 4, 2008. 
http://www.thisissyria.net/2008/12/04/syriatoday/02.html.; Levant News. “ لصتت تاماهتا ىلع ءانب وراتفك حلص لاقتعا
يملسلا وراتفك عمجم لمعب (Salah Kiftaru Arrested on Charges Related to Work of the Islamic Kiftaru 
Congregation)”, July 1, 2009. http://www.thisissyria.net/2009/07/01/syriatoday/06.html. 
16Shikai, Janblaat. “  داعبإ1200ةيروس يف سيردتلا كلس نم ةبقنم ”, June 10, 2010. http://www.alraimedia.com/alrai/Art-
icle.aspx?id=208547&date=10062010. France 24. “Minister of Education Decrees to Transfer Niqabs [away] 
from Field of Education in Defence of Secularism.”, July 1, 2010. http://www.france24.com/ar/20100701-reli-
gious-laic-interdiction-niqab-syrie-education. ; “All4Syria ::  يدقتنم ىلع  افينع  اموجه نونشي نوماحم - نطولا يف ءاكرش انلك
ةيصخشلا لاوحلا نوناق عورشم”, July 15, 2010. http://all4syria.info/content/view/29289/161/; also: Muh. Habbash: 
All4Syria. “فاقولا ةرازوب ةينيدلا هتاطاشن ةفاك نم ليقتسي شبح دمحم خيشلا ..!” All4syria.info, September 10, 2010. 
http://all4syria.info/content/view/31939/96/ 
17For instance, in 2004 a shoot out took place in the up-market Mezze quarter in Damascus. The government 
claimed that Islamic terrorists had taken refuge there. A year later a shoot out took place in Jabal Qassioun, a 
mountain ridge overlooking the capital, in which two Islamists were killed. A shoot out in Aleppo also occurred 
(see: New York Times. “Syria Police Foil Terrorist.” New York Times, December 5, 2005. http://query.nytimes.-
com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9807E1DF1331F936A35751C1A9639C8B63). In both instances only a few indi-
viduals were involved – according to officials. In July 2008 Islamist prisoners at the Saydnaya prison, a village 
some thirty kilometers from Damascus, rose up against prison management and kidnapped prison personnel 
(See: Saad, Houwaida. “Police Kill 9 Inmates During Prison Riot in Syria.” The New York Times, July 6, 2008, 
sec. International / Middle East. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/06/world/middleeast/06syria.html). In august 
that year a car bomb in Damascus killed 17 (see: Worth, Robert F. “Car Bomb Kills 17 in Syria Near Intelli-
gence Office.” The New York Times, September 28, 2008, sec. International / Middle East. http://www.nytimes.-
com/2008/09/28/world/middleeast/28syria.html.) For an overview see: as-Sharq al-Awsat. “ ثادحلاو تامجهلا مهأ
راــــــبخأ ,ةيروس اهل تضرعت يتلا ةينملا.” as-Sharq al-Awsat, September 28, 2008. http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?
section=4&issueno=10897&article=488597&search=%D3%E6%D1%ED%C7&state=true. 
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capital. In the period 2003-2007 the Aleppo-based Salafi shaykh “Abu Qaqa”
gained notoriety for sending Syrians over the border to Iraq to fight Americans
(seemingly  with  tacit  regime approval),  until  he  was assassinated  in  2007.18
Another main example of Islamism is the prison uprising that took place in the
Sadnaya  prison  in  July  2008  where  Islamist  prisoners  took  over  in  protest
against poor living standards. It took weeks to quell the uprising, and many of
the imprisoned were never heard of again.19 All of these examples are shrouded
in mystery due to a very strict regime information blockade.
Continuing to Phase 1: Non-violent Repertoires
All of the above represent isolated instances of contention – the regime’s power
was never threatened, and this seemed to hold even in the context of the Arab
spring. Some Syrians did attempt to mobilize by calling for a Syrian “day of
rage” as a reaction to the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions, for instance on 1
February 2011, but significant numbers of Syrians failed to take to the streets.20
What was needed was a spark,  a  specific “transformative” event that  would
mobilize  larger  parts  of  society.  Such  an  event  eventually  emerged  in  the
southern  town  of  Dara'  on  6  March  2011.  The  following  section  describes
protests during the first phase of the Syrian uprising, which drew on a mostly
non-violent mobilization repertoire. The section after will discuss the increase
of violence in the opposition mobilization repertoire as well as the increasing
importance  of  international  actors  in  the  uprising.  The  current  section  is
18Another example in this respect is Abu Qaqa: a supposedly Jihadi shaykh, based in Aleppo, that was helping 
Jihadi youngsters to go to Iraq and fight Americans. He was only able to do this due to (implicit) support of the 
Syrian regime. Many, mainly youngsters, in the city were drawn to his basic lifestyle and militant Salafist an-
ti-US rhetoric. As the Syrian position vis-à-vis Iraq changed due to a major international backlash, his position 
became more questionable. First his sudden increased wealth was reported and doubts raised over his apparent 
position to American and/or Syrian intelligence services (Moubayed 2006). Then, in October 2007, he was 
gunned down in front of his mosque in Aleppo. For more information, see: Ghaith, Abdul-Ahad. “From Here  to
Eternity.” The Guardian, June 8, 2005, sec. World news. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/jun/08/ir-
aq-al-qaida.; and McGregor, Andrew. “Controversial Syrian Preacher Abu al-Qaqa Gunned Down in Aleppo - 
The Jamestown Foundation.” Terrorism Focus, October 16, 2007. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?
no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=4481 
19Syrian Human Rights Committee. “New Massacre in Sednaya Military Prison,” July 5, 2008. http://www.shr-
c.org/data/aspx/d0/3620.aspx. 
20France 24. “  سنارف - ايروس - ةعمجلا ةلص دعب دسلا دض ’بضغ موي‘ عم دعوم يف نويروسلا24ةيلودلا ولراك تنوم - .” FRANCE 
24 - Monte Carlo Doualiya, February 4, 2011. http://www.france24.com/ar/20110203-syria-demonstra-
tions-bashar-alAsad-day-anger-friday-prayer. 
———. “راــــــبخأ ,ماصتعلاو رهاظتلل تاوعد لايح تماص يروسلا عراشلا.” FRANCE 24 - Monte Carlo Doualiya, Februa-
ry 2, 2011. http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=11754&article=606504&search=
%D3%E6%D1%ED%C7&state=true. 
———. “  سنارف - ايروس - ؟ايروس يف ’بضغلا موي‘ ةوعد ءارو نم24ةيلودلا ولراك تنوم - ”, February 4, 2011. http://www.-
france24.com/ar/20110204-syria-demonstrations-bashar-alassad-day-anger-friday-prayer. The New York Times. 
“‘Day of Rage’ Protest Fails to Materialize in Syria.” The New York Times, February 4, 2011, sec. World / 
Middle East. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/05/world/middleeast/05syria.html?
_r=1&scp=37&sq=tunisia&st=nyt. And two weeks later small demonstration appeared in Damascus: Landis, 
Joshua. “Demonstration in Damascus.” Syria Comment, February 18, 2011. http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?
p=8410&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Syriacomment+
%28Syria+Comment%29.
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subdivided into four parts on the basis of actors organizing protests. 
Dara's spontaneous protests.  On March 6, 2011, a group of youngsters
wrote “As-sha'ab yurid isqat an-nizam” (the people want the fall of the regime)
on a wall in Daraa'.21 For copying what they had seen on the television about
Tunisia and Egypt, they were arrested and tortured. None were older than 15.
The story goes that when the local governor was asked about their whereabouts
and release, he replied that if they missed their children so much they should
give him their wives – he would make them some new ones. In a region where
clan ties are very strong, and family honor an important part of social reality, the
families and the town were enraged. Relatives first took to the streets on 11
March 2011 and marched to the governors house to demand their  childrens’
release. They were met by bullets. They took to the streets again on 15 March.
And again the next Friday, 18 March, after Friday prayers. An estimated three to
four thousand people joined the protests that day to demand the release of the
boys and express their anger at the security services.22 Facing bullets again, four
were killed. The next day their funerals turned into even larger protests.23 The
protests were largely non-violent but in their anger local Ba'ath party offices
were attacked and burned. (In addition to shops, Syriatel among others. More on
this later.)24 
Dara'  provided  the  event  that  mobilized  a  large  cross-section  of  the
country in what was to be a wave of  non-institutionalized nationwide protest.
Lacking pre-institutionalization, the initial protests drew on a mixture of (new)
social  media  and  pre-existing  social  (and  religious)  institutions  to  mobilize
people.  Calls  went out  over the internet  – and soon by TV stations such as
Aljazeera – for a “Friday of Dignity”, but it was only on the basis of traditional
family,  clan  and  religious  ties  that  large  scale  protests  could  be  organized.
Friday prayers, the only events where it was possible to gather large groups of
people,  were  used  as  springboards  for  protests.25 Local  social  and  religious
leaders gained early acceptance as crucial actors in the protests.26 Though often
organized around mosques and Friday prayers,  the protesters'  demands were
explicitly non-religious and non-sectarian. The above was particularly clear in
21Zoepf, Katherine. “Long Repressed, a Syrian Opposition Takes Shape.” The New York Times, April 27, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/world/middleeast/28syria.html. Macleod, Hugh. “Inside Deraa.” al-Jaz-
eera, April 19, 2011. http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/features/2011/04/201141918352728300.html. 
22al-Khalidi, Suleiman. “Syrian Forces Kill Three Protesters in Southern City.” Reuters. DERAA, Syria, March 
18, 2011. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/18/us-syria-protest-idUSTRE72H88M20110318. 
23Leenders, Reinoud. “Collective Action and Mobilization in Dar’a: An Anatomy of the Onset of Syria’s Popular
Uprising.” Mobilization: An International Quarterly (Forthcoming), p.13-14. 
24For a detailed contentious mobilization inspired analysis of the Dara' uprising, see Leenders and Heydemann 
(2012). 
25Early protest in Souq al-hamadiya: France 24. “سنارف - ايروس - ةيرحلاو رييغتلا لجأ نم رهاظتلل ةوعد نوبلي نييروسلا تارشع
24ةيلودلا ولراك تنوم - ”, March 15, 2011. http://www.france24.com/ar/20110315-syria-demonstra-
tions-change-freedom-bashar-alassad-facebook. ; The New York Times. “Police Kill 6 Protesters in Syria.” The 
New York Times, March 18, 2011, sec. World / Middle East. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/19/world/middleeast/19syria.html. 
26Kodmani, Bassma. “The Road to Ruin for the Assad Regime.” Financial Times, June 14, 2011. http://www.ft.-
com/cms/s/0/5bdf4198-96b8-11e0-baca-00144feab49a.html#axzz1PMoNuXKI. 
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the first “Fridays of Rage” in Damascus, Homs, Idlib, and Banyas – naturally
next to that held in Dara'.27 
The amount of people on the streets during the first Friday was limited in
many places, but over the next few weeks the amount and size of the protests
grew rapidly.  On the  second and third  Fridays  (25 and 1  April)  protests  in
Homs, Dara' and Banyas numbered from hundreds to a few thousand.28 Protests
also emerged in Latakya,  Deir  Ez-Zor and Damascus.  Demands were aimed
mainly  against  the  (power  of)  the  security  services  and  corruption;  and  for
political liberalization.29 Facebook, youtube and satellite news channels became
a central tool in disseminating calls for mobilization. At the same time, Friday
prayers  and  funerals  remained  the  focal  points  for  the  emergence  of  actual
protests,  as  they  involved  gatherings  of  people.  The  same  would  later,  for
instance, be true for universities.30 Protesters by and large drew on a non-violent
protest repertoire but were met with bullets. On 25 March 19 were killed, on the
next Friday 29.31 The following days funerals turned into protests.32
Throughout  these  first  weeks  (and  sometimes  even  before  15  March)
“councils”  had emerged,  for  instance in  Dara'.  They were often  founded by
people  who had met  at  rallies,  and had formed a social  bond through their
experience of regime repression (and live ammunition). Many had not known
each  other  before.33 With  the  increasing  size  of  the  protests  and  continued
mobilization these councils became increasingly institutionalized, coming to be
known as the  local coordination committees (LCCs).  (May – August 2011).34
27Stack, Liam, and Katherine Zoepf. “Syria Tries to Placate Sunnis and Kurds.” The New York Times, April 6, 
2011, sec. World / Middle East. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/07/world/middleeast/07syria.html. Also exem-
plified by the attention that formal Syrian media gave to the “fact” that local religious leaders were on their side,
see: “Daraa Mufti Withdraws His Resignation SANA , Syria,” May 10, 2011. 
http://www.sana.sy/eng/337/2011/05/10/345858.htm; Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA). “Grand Mufti: Con-
fronting Sedition Is Religious and Moral Commitment to Preserve Freedom of Syria,” May 12, 2011. 
http://www.sana.sy/eng/337/2011/05/12/346463.htm. 
28France 24. “Protests in Numerous Cities and Increasing Death Toll Despite Assad’s Declaration on Reforms.” 
France 24, March 25, 2011. http://www.france24.com/ar/20110325-daraa-syria-clashes-fire-demonstration-po-
lice-dead. 
29Ibid. 
30France 24. “  ةلاحإ400 سنارف - ايروس - ’ةلودلا سيئر ريقحتو بغشلا ‘ ةمهتب ءاضقلا مامأ بلح ةعماج نم بلاط 24 ولراك تنوم - 
ةيلودلا,” June 27, 2011. http://www.france24.com/ar/20110627-syria-justice-trial-students-accused-demonstraters-
kurdish-human-right-statment-critic-against-alassad. 
———. “  سنارف - ايروس - عمقلاو فنعلا لامعأ نيدت سيرابو قشمد ةعماج يف ايبلط اعمجت قرفي نملا24 ولراك تنوم - 
ةيلودلا,” April 11, 2011. http://www.france24.com/ar/20110411-syria-damascus-university-arrest-demonstrations-
paris-condemns. 
31Following the numbers provided by: http://syrianshuhada.com/default.asp?a=st&st=3.  These numbers tend to 
overestimate the number of casualties by about 10%.  
32Protesters were mostly male, but women also took to the streets.  Though less visible following increasing re-
gime repression, they do play an active role in supporting protests. See: Stack, Liam, and Katherine Zoepf. 
“Clashes Intensify in Syria as Protesters Reject Assad’s Concessions.” The New York Times, April 18, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/19/world/middleeast/19syria.html. 
33Leenders, Reinoud. “Collective Action and Mobilization in Dar’a: An Anatomy of the Onset of Syria’s Popular
Uprising.” Mobilization: An International Quarterly (Forthcoming). 
34Shadid, Anthony. “Disparate Factions From Streets Fuel New Opposition in Syria.” The New York Times, June 
30, 2011, sec. World / Middle East. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/world/middleeast/01syria.html. ; 
Zoepf, Katherine. “Long Repressed, a Syrian Opposition Takes Shape.” The New York Times, April 27, 2011, 
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Institutionalized  at  the  neighborhood  level,  these  committees  emerged  from
practical  needs  associated  with  collective  mobilization:  organizing  protests,
gathering and disseminating information.35 In time, they became the institutional
backbone  of  peaceful  protests  throughout  the  country.  Although  committees
emerged  that  were  mostly  Kurdish,  Sunni  or  from  minority  groups  –  they
always attempted to be as inclusive as possible to any kind of social group.36 
Emboldened by the seeming early successes in overwhelming the regime,
these committees became increasingly active.37 The Syrian authorities retreated
from  various  cities  around  the  country  (most  notably  Homs  and  Hama),
apparently attempting to focus repression on the two main cities of Aleppo and
Damascus and make some concessions to the protesters. Protests only expanded
as a result.38 On 8 April 2011 hundreds of thousands of Syrians reportedly took
to  the  streets  (though the  number  is  probably  an  overestimation)  in  various
Syrian cities on the “Friday of Patience” (sumud)39 – 73 were killed.40 A week
later  –  on  the  “Friday  of  Insistence”  –  between  thousands41 and  tens  of
thousands42 of  protesters  were  reported  in  various  cities  across  the  country.
“Only” 11 people were killed that day.43 All of these protests demanded the fall
of the regime. Concerning repertoires, they explicitly copied from the examples
of Tunisia and Egypt. Generally, they remained explicitly non-violent and non-
sectarian. Committees quickly adopted tools that were also used by protesters in
other  Arab  countries:  where  first  there  had  been  nothing,  now  placards,
petitions, songs, Facebook pages, and many youtube videos were used to protest
against  the regime. More specifically, repertoires differed between cities and
their  coordination  committees.  In  Hama  protesters  attempted  to  occupy  the
central  square,  while  in  Duma  (a  Damascus  suburb)  a  campaign  of  civil
disobedience  was attempted.44 Every  committee  charted  its  own course.  The
phase ends with various cities being raided and LCC activists (among many
sec. World / Middle East. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/world/middleeast/28syria.html. 
35Ibid and see: http://www.lccsyria.org/about. 
36Leenders, Reinoud. “Collective Action and Mobilization in Dar’a: An Anatomy of the Onset of Syria’s Popular
Uprising.” Mobilization: An International Quarterly (Forthcoming).  
37 Stack, Liam, and Katherine Zoepf. “Clashes Intensify in Syria as Protesters Reject Assad’s Concessions.” The 
New York Times, April 18, 2011, sec. World / Middle East. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/19/world/middleeast/19syria.html. 
38Shadid, Anthony. “Syria Pulls Armed Forces From Some Cities.” The New York Times, June 29, 2011, sec. 
World / Middle East. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/30/world/middleeast/30syria.html. 
39 as-Sharq al-Awsat. “ىـــــلولا ,«ثعبلا»ـل تارقم قرحو تارشعلاب ىلتق ..رجفنت ةيروس,” April 9, 2011. http://www.aawsat.-
com/details.asp?section=1&issueno=11820&article=61647  8. 
40http://syrianshuhada.com/default.asp?a=st&st=3
41France 24. “  سنارف - ايروس - ةديدج ةموكح نع نلعلا مغر ةديدع ندم يف نورهاظتي فللا24ةيلودلا ولراك تنوم - ,” April 15, 
2011. http://www.france24.com/ar/20110415-syria-bashar-alassad-demonstrations-friday-prayer-freedom-hu-
man-rights-reforms. ; In Dara' 2,500 to 3000 people took to the streets that day: according to All4Syria. “تارهاظت
قشمدل اهلوصو نع ءابنأو ةيروس ندم ةدع يف ةيملس.” All4Syria.info, April 15, 2011. 
http://all4syria.info/web/archives/3743. 
42“ىـــــلولا ,«ماظنلا طاقسإ» رارصلا ةعمج راعش ..ةيروس,” April 16, 2011. http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?
section=1&issueno=11827&article=617538. 
43According to: http://syrianshuhada.com/default.asp?a=st&st=3 
44Shadid, Anthony. “Disparate Factions From Streets Fuel New Opposition in Syria.” The New York Times, June
30, 2011, sec. World / Middle East. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/world/middleeast/01syria.html. 
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others) being arrested. Despite severe repression the LCCs survived, remained
operational and eventually succeeded in creating an umbrella organization: the
Local Coordinating Committees of Syria (LCCS).45 A list of the key protests
during this period can be found in Appendix C. 
Concerning  subsequent  dynamics,  a  deadlock  in  the  protests  emerged
where the regime's use of live ammunition was not able to completely suppress
the uprising, but protesters were incapable of enlarging the protests (or seriously
endangering  the  regime)  due  to  repression.  This  situation,  where  protesters
persisted in the face of live ammunition, occasional shelling, and mass arrests,
marked much of the following year of protests.  Though there was a natural
tendency to use violence (see the next phase) they were resisted by coordination
committees  calling  for  the  use  of  a  non-violent  protest  repertoire.  Another
dynamic seen in the following year – one that the strong nationalistic message
of the coordination committees could not obscure – was the over-representation
of  Sunnis  in  the  protests.  Although protests  and  committees  were  (and are)
explicitly  non-sectarian,  some biases  within  the  make  up of  the  committees
were soon apparent: it was overtly Sunnis from smaller cities that joined the
uprising. Minorities and “elite” Sunnis remained largely on the sidelines.46 In
the Idlib region a ptimarily foreign-based Syrian Salafi shaykh, Adnan al-Arour,
incited protests for many months.47 Kurdish LCCs alsoemerged in the Kurdish
North-East of the country.48 In July 2011 Sunni and Alawis clashed in Homs,
only  to  be  (relatively)  contained  through  the  intervention  of  local  shaykhs,
social leaders and committees.49 The LCC umbrella organization could not hide
the  fact  that  certain  tendencies  –  for  the  use  of  violence  and  concerning
sectarian tensions within the uprising – had grown stronger.50 
At the start of Ramadan 2011 (almost five months into the uprising) the
death toll stood at around 2000, it had already risen by another thousand bt the
end of the month.51 
Phase 2: Violent Repertoires
This phase is marked by the gradual increase in the use of violent modes of
45See: http://www.lccsyria.org/about; Shadid, Anthony. “Assad’s Forces Pound City at Center of Syrian Revolt.” 
The New York Times, April 27, 2011, sec. World / Middle East. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/world/middleeast/28daraa.html. 
46Kodmani, Bassma. “The Road to Ruin for the Assad Regime.” Financial Times, June 14, 2011. http://www.ft.-
com/cms/s/0/5bdf4198-96b8-11e0-baca-00144feab49a.html#axzz1PMoNuXKI. 
47See his youtube channel at: http://www.youtube.com/user/adnanalarour 
48KurdWatch. “Conflicts with the Kurdish Patriotic Conference Lead to Division of Protest Movement.” Kurd-
Watch.org, November 7, 2011. http://www.kurdwatch.org/index.php?aid=2167&z=en&cure=232. 
49“Syria Comment » Archives » Syrians Scared and Angered by Sectarian Fighting. Little Unity Among 
Opposition,” July 19, 2011. http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=10837. 
50Shadid, Anthony. “Disparate Factions From Streets Fuel New Opposition in Syria.” The New York Times, June 
30, 2011, sec. World / Middle East. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/world/middleeast/01syria.html. 
51Number according to www.syrianshuhada.com. As they tend to overestimate their death toll, I round the num-
ber downwards. 
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mobilization.  From  the  very  start  of  the  uprising  there  were  instances  of
spontaneous uses of violence against regime officials, security services, army
personnel  and party  (Ba'ath)  buildings.  The use  of  violent  modes  of  protest
became more organized and escalated as more Syrian soldiers began to defect
and the Libyan – violent – uprising proved successful in defeating Gadaffi’s
army. Militias formed between friends, clans, and neighborhoods rose up next to
the  civil  coordination  committees.  The  phase  ends  with  the  entire  country
sliding into civil war. 
Spontaneous use of Violence
From the start of the uprising there were debates over the use of violence in the
popular  uprising.  The  general  opinion  among  activists  was  that  violent
mobilization  repertoires  would  only  invite  more  regime  violence.  But,  in
reaction to violent regime repression, there were instances of spontaneous uses
of violence by small groups of people from March 2011 onwards.52 An early
example was explored by Joshua Landis, Director of the Center for Middle East
Studies  at  the  University  of  Oklahoma:  in  April  2011  an  apparent  case  of
defecting soldiers being shot by their commander in Banyas turned out to be an
ambush by armed opposition Syrians. 9 soldiers were killed.53 An activist from
Saraqib (Idlib region) reminded the author that youngsters in his village had, at
the start of the uprising, used antique rifles to shoot at a car carrying security
personnel as they entered the city to arrest protesters. Many other examples of
local  youths  taking  up  guns  by  themselves  were  mentioned  in  interviews.54
However, it should be stated again that the use of violent repertoires was, at the
start of the upsrising, a very spontaneous and localized affair. 
What happened at Jisr as-Shourough on 6 June 2011 is noteworthy. It was
initially described as a mass defection followed by intra-army clashes,55 but was
probably one of the first successful attempts by local residents to ambush the
army and subsequently ransack and attack all the government buildings in the
town.56 The  town’s  inhabitants  quickly  announced  it  to  be  “liberated”.  The
reaction from the regime aimed to send a message: the town was surrounded,
shelled relentlessly and retaken a week later by the army (the fourth division
under the command of Maher al-Asad) after heavy fighting. It was the first time
52Slackman, Michael, and Liam Stack. “Syria Tense as Protesters Mourn Their Dead.” The New York Times, 
March 26, 2011, sec. World / Middle East. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/27/world/middleeast/27syria.html. 
53Landis, Joshua. “The Armed Gangs Controversy,” August 3, 2011. http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?
p=11181&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Syriacomment+%28Syr-
ia+Comment%29. 
54For instance: interview with group of Syrian opposition youngsters, 29 August 2011, Istanbul. Turkey. 
55Stack, Liam. “Syria, Claiming Heavy Toll in Town, Hints at Retaliation.” The New York Times, June 6, 2011, 
sec. World / Middle East. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/07/world/middleeast/07syria.html. 
56“Syria Comment » Archives » What Happened at Jisr al-Shagour?,” June 13, 2011. http://www.joshualandis.-
com/blog/?p=10202. 
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that clashes between opposition and army were reported at this scale.57 Despite
the apparent failure of the exploit, Jisr as-Shourough would prove an example
for other regions and cities.  Where violence had previously been sporadic, it
became more widespread after this event.
Army Defectors
Army defection increased, became more organized, and started to play a role in
the uprising in direct relation to increasing repression by the regime (see the
contingent political opportunities section). In practice, the divide between army
defectors  and  regular  Syrians  taking  up  arms  was  often  very  blurred.  The
number  of  army  desertions  was  very  limited  during  the  first  weeks  of  the
uprising, but gradually rose as regime repression (and therefore the deployment
of the army) became more extensive. Despite hopeful early signs (see the Jisr
as-Shourough example above) defections never threatened the stability of the
army and/or regime. Numbers were too low, and defectors were by and large
Sunnis – while sensitive and crucial positions are often held by Alawi generals
and officers. At the same time defections did provide the opposition within the
army with a source of military expertise. 
On 29 July 2011 (just before the start of Ramadan),58 the formation of the
Free  Syrian  Army was  announced via  a  youtube  declaration.  Founded by 7
officers,  it  explicitly  aimed to promote desertions and protect  civilians from
government  repression.59 The  existence  of  violent  repertoires  was  therefore
theoretically legitimized by their purely “defensive” application; safeguarding
the  peaceful  nature  of  the  popular  uprising.  In  addition,  the  institutional
structures  and resources  of  groups  using  violent  and  non-violent  repertoires
were strictly split. In practice this differentiation was often ambiguous, as the
earlier  spontaneous  uses  of  violence  show:  what  were  depicted  as  army
defectors were often to a large degree local inhabitants taking up arms under the
banner of a loosely organized “Free Syrian Army”. 
Militias
In June-July 2011 various militias began to emerge in some parts of the country
to “protect  the people”.  They were often organized around a small  group of
people within a neighborhood, mosque or village. Though influenced by the
57as-Sharq al-Awsat. “راــــــبخأ ,ايكرت ىلإ نورفي تائملاو ..تارتبوكيلهلاو تابابدلاب ةموعدم روغشلا رسج محتقت دسلا تاوق,” June 13,
2011. http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=11885&article=626305&search=
%D3%E6%D1%ED%C7&state=true. 
58  ,رحلا يروسلا شيجلا ليكشت نلعا2011 . http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=SZcCbIPM37w&feature=youtube_gdata_player. 
59Landis, Joshua. “Free Syrian Army Founded by Seven Officers to Fight the Syrian Army.” Syria Comment, 
July 29, 2011. http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=11043. 
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successful  repression  of  the  first  generation  within  the  coordination
committees60 and the ever increasing repression of peaceful protests,  the real
turning point  came through an example from a fellow Arab country.  On 20
August  2011  (during  Ramadan)  a  broad  coalition  of  Libyan  rebel  forces
successfully attacked Tripoli, the capital of their country. The success of this
operation sent shock waves through the Syrian opposition. Discussions started
to tilt in favor of the use of arms.61 Soon after, cities had multiple (up to more
than a dozen) militias. Formally, the FSA was the umbrella organization for all
these militias, though in practice it never really took on this role. The legitimacy
of the FSA remained limited and was primarily used as a common denominator
for  the  outside  world.  The  emergence  of  militias  also  laid  the  basis  for  an
Islamization of the uprising. Many of the Salafi-style groups proved most adept
at securing (financial and armed) support from backers in (mostly) conservative
gulf countries.62 
Villages and towns.
In the year that followed the formation of the FSA and the emergence of the
militias, a gruesome deadlock of escalating violence took hold of the uprising.
Syrians continued to protest,  the army continued to repress,  but  increasingly
militias (more or less under the banner of the “FSA”) would fight the regime
back. Neighborhoods, towns, and cities were invaded by the Syrian army, but it
often proved unable to fully regain control of the area. Dara' (April 2011)63 and
Hama (August 2011)64 were early examples of the regime’s retaking control of a
city, but Homs (November 201165 – March 2012)66 would be the first example
where  militias  actively  –  and for  a  long time  effectively  –  opposed  regime
incursions.67 Other  examples  to  follow  were  the  Jebel  al-Zawiyah  area
(January/February  2012)68 and increasingly  the  suburbs  of  Damascus.  In  all
60Bakri, Nada. “In Syrian Town, Uprising Turns Into Grim Standoff.” The New York Times, September 15, 
2011, sec. World / Middle East. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/16/world/middleeast/in-syrian-town-upris-
ing-turns-into-grim-standoff.html. 
61Interview with Alawi opposition activist from Damascus, 24 August 2011, Istanbul. Turkey. 
62For an analysis of the Free Syrian Army, in relation to militias and Islam from March 2012, see (Rosen 2012).  
63France 24. “  سنارف - ايروس - اعرد ةنيدم يف دجسم ماحتقا يف صاخشأ ةتس لتقت نملا تاوق24ةيلودلا ولراك تنوم - ,” March 23, 
2011. http://www.france24.com/ar/20110323-deadly-crackdown-anti-government-assad-protests-omari-mosque-
syria. 
64France 24. “  سنارف - ايروس - قشمد نيدي رارق رادصل ةئراط ةسلج دقعي نملا سلجمو ةامح يف ةينكس قطانم فصقت تابابدلا24تنوم - 
ةيلودلا ولراك,” August 1, 2011. http://www.france24.com/ar/20110801-germany-calls-un-meeting-syria-secur-
ity-crackdown-hama-death-toll-mounts.   
65Shadid, Anthony. “Syria Lays Siege to a City, Homs, That Puts Up a Fight.” The New York Times, November 
7, 2011, sec. World / Middle East. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/world/middleeast/syri-
an-city-of-homs-suffers-bloody-assault.html. 
66Macfarquhar, Neil. “Syrian Rebels Withdrawing From Key Enclave in Homs.” The New York Times, March 1,
2012, sec. World / Middle East. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/02/world/middleeast/rebels-resisting-on-
slaught-in-syrian-city-activists-say.html. 
67Fahim, Kareem. “Arab League Delegates Arrive in Syria.” The New York Times, December 22, 2011, sec. 
World / Middle East. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/23/world/middleeast/arab-league-delegates-ar-
rive-in-syria.html. 
68Ibid. 
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these cases, residents became increasingly well armed, trained and organized in
resisting violent Syrian repression. Non-violent protests now began to follow
the dynamic of the violent conflict (for instance the “Friday of the Free Army”
on  14  October  2011)  rather  than  the  other  way  around.  The  region
encompassing  Idlib,  Homs  and  Hama  proved  the  most  active:69 it  is  a
conservative Sunni majority region in which shaykhs such as Adnan al-Arour
were  very  effective  in  stirring  up  mobilization  and  supporting  armed
insurrection.70 The Kurdish regions were to some extent mobilized, especially
after the killing of the opposition figure Machal Tammo.71 Dara' and the south
had been silenced effectively. The largest two cities – Aleppo and Damascus –
remained mostly quiet.  In Damascus it  was impossible to rise up due to the
dense presence of security forces, while in Aleppo inhabitants were generally
wary of mobilizing due to their (economic) interests in maintaining the political
regime.
Jihadists
On 18 July 2012 a successful attack on the elite leaders of the regime killed
Asef Shawkat, the minister of defense, and three other elite security leaders.72
Responsibility  was claimed by the FSA and the Jihadi  group  Liwa al-Islam
(Brigade  of  Islam).  The  attack  electrified  the  opposition  by  showing  the
vulnerability of those at the very top of the Syrian regime. Immediately after, an
attack on various neighborhoods in Damascus was started.73 Although rebels
were not able to secure the whole city, the regime has to date not been able to
regain  full  control  of  the  suburbs.  Soon  after,  rebels  attacked  Aleppo  and
succeeded in securing large parts of the city.74 The attacks meant that the war
had now come to the two largest cities and that the whole country was now
descending into civil war. The attacks were only possible because inter-militia
coordination had increased: where there used to be many small militia groups,
69Kennedy, J. Micheal. “Kurds Remain on Sideline in Syria’s Uprising.” New York Times, April 17, 2012. 
http://www.n  ytimes.com/2012/04/18/world/middleeast/kurds-remain-on-sideline-in-syrias-uprising.html?page-
wanted=all. 
70Rosen, Nir. “Islamism and the Syrian Uprising.” Foreign Policy, March 8, 2012.  http://midea  st.foreignpolicy.-
com/posts/2012/03/08/islamism_and_the_syrian_uprising. 
71Bakri, Nada. “Attack by Syrian Forces Leaves Opposition Leader Dead.” The New York Times, October 7, 
2011, sec. World / Middle East. http://www  .nytimes.com/2011/10/08/world/middleeast/leading-syrian-opposi-
tion-figure-killed-another-publicly-beaten.html 
72 “Bombing Kills Key Assad Aides as Syria Fighting Rages - NYTimes.com,” July 18, 2012. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/19/world/middleeast/suicide-attack-reported-in-damascus-as-more-gener-
als-flee.html?pagewanted=all   .
“Profiles of Syrian Officials Targeted in Damascus Blast - NYTimes.com,” July 18, 2012.  http://www.nytimes.-
com/2012/07/19/world/middleeast/profiles-of-syrian-officials-targeted-in-damascus-blast.html?pagewanted=all  . 
73Macfarquhar, Neil. “Fighting Grips Syrian Capital After Attack on Assad’s Inner Circle.” New York Times, July
19, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/20/world/middleeast/syria-clashes-continue-after-bomb-
ing-kills-key-assad-aides.html?pagewanted=all. 
74 Macfarquhar, Neil. “Ancient Aleppo Echoes With Gunfire as War Reaches Its Cobbled Streets.” New York 
Times, July 24, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/25/world/middleeast/use-of-warplanes-is-repor-
ted-in-syrian-conflict.html?pagewanted=all. 
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more powerful rebel groups had now formed through alliances and unifications.
Current examples of powerful militias are the Farouk Brigade in Homs and liwa
at-Tawhid in Aleppo – though new militias are constantly being formed and/or
renamed. With help from Gulf countries these militias were able to sustain an
effective urban-based guerrilla campaign throughout the country. Despite the
increased coordination, the effective influence of the FSA remained limited.75
At the time of writing large parts of the country are no longer under the
full control of the regime and fighting in Aleppo, Idlib, Homs and the capital
Damascus has dragged on for months. After Ramadan 2011 the death toll stood
at around 3000, before 18 July 2012 (the date of the attack on the security elite)
the death toll was around 20.000.76 With the escalation into a full civil war the
social, economic and state structures of the country were also affected: many
fled their homes, and in some regions the state ceased to function. New forms of
“emergency state structures” were built by LCCs and militias. Popular protests
were now eclipsed by the armed struggle.  The coordination committees lost
importance  as  compared  to  the  militias.  In  this  context,  discussions  about
foreign intervention also came to the fore.
Phase 3 (Foreign Influence)
This phase is defined by the ever increasing foreign involvement in the Syrian
uprising.  Although  there  were  signs  of  this  early  after  March  2011  as  the
uprising  escalated  into  civil  war,  foreign  involvement  has  become  more
pronounced. I delineate this phase in four sections, based again on the types of
actors involved (and their positions vis-à-vis the Syrian nation). 
First, the exiled Syrians. In the first few months after the uprising many
exiled Syrian attempted to build representation for the uprising. These attempts
were embodied by many conferences aimed at forming a representative body
for the uprising abroad. Many succumbed before even starting,77 until the so-
called  Syrian  National  Council  (SNC)  was  founded  on  23  August  2011.78
Though plagued by internal dissent (the Kurds walked out after a number of
months,  allegations  of  corruption  were  widespread  and  it  was  eventually
dominated by one party: the Syrian Muslim brotherhood) it still persisted for
75Macfarquhar, Neil. “Syrian Opposition Gets Supplies but Unity Is Elusive.” New York Times, June 25, 2012. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/26/world/middleeast/syrian-opposition-gets-sup-
plies-but-unity-is-elusive.html?pagewanted=all. 
76Number according to www.syrianshuhada.com. As they tend to overestimate their death toll, I round the num-
ber downwards. 
77See the example of the “salvation” meeting: France 24. “‘ - ةيروسلا ةضراعملا فايطأ لخاد تاماسقنا ريثي ’ينطولا سلجملا
 سنارف - ايروس24ةيلودلا ولراك تنوم - ,” August 22, 2011. http://www.france24.com/ar/20110822-syria-opposition-di-
vision-about-national-council-revolution-council. 
———. “  سنارف - ايروس - ’يروسلا ينطولا سلجملا‘ ليكشتل لوبنطسا يف نوعمتجي نويروس نوضراعم24ةيلودلا ولراك تنوم - ,” Au-
gust 20, 2011. http://www.france24.com/ar/20110820-syr  ia-turkey-istanbul-opposition-syrian-national-coun-
cil-anti-regime-assad. 
78Syrian National Council. “  يروسلا ينطولا سلجملا سيسأت نلعإ 23-08-2011 .” Aljazeera, August 23, 2011. 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=  W5vv-g_U1G0&feature=player_embedded#%21. 
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almost a year as no alternative was present.  Only in November 2012 was it
effectively superseded by the “National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and
Opposition Forces”, or simply the National Coalition (NC).79 
Concerning mobilization, these councils were primarily important as the
link between the domestic opposition and foreign governments. It was hoped
that  they  would  galvanize  hopes  among Syrians  that  a  government  in  exile
could be formed and thereby fan protests inside the country. Instead, the SNC
showcased how difficult  it  would be to build a government  after  the fall  of
Bashar, and how deeply internal schisms ran in the country. An initial problem
was that these councils were mostly built by earlier exiled Syrians. This resulted
in a lack of legitimacy inside the country (specifically in relation to the “FSA”
and LCCs) and internal discontent between traditional opposition groups (the
Islamists, secular left-wing groups, the Kurds, etc).80 With numbers of refugees
rising throughout the conflict, these councils came to be manned increasingly by
more recent exiles with continued legitimacy inside the country. The National
Coalition was founded in November 2012, and its president Mouaz al-Khatib
(an activist, shaykh and recent refugee) is trying to revive the role of foreign
representation  of  the  uprising  (including  armed  resistance),  emphasize  the
national  characteristics  of  the  uprising  and  draw  support  from  foreign
governments for the Syrian cause.81 To what extent he will be successful and the
coalition will remain unified remains to be seen. 
Second, we find domesticated foreign influences that became interlinked
with the dynamics of the uprising. Throughout Syrian history multiple foreign
groups have found refuge inside Syria, or have built up a special relationship
with  the  country.  This  is  for  instance  true  of  a  large  group  of  Palestinian
refugees – and their opposition organizations – that live and are active in Syria.
Their refugee camps have transformed over the decades into indistinguishable
parts  of  Syrian  cities  and  society.82 Also,  for  years  there  have  been  close
relations between various Syrian Kurdish groups, the Turkish PKK and Iraqi
Kurdish parties.83 In addition, on an organizational level, the Syrian regime has
always had close relations with the Palestinian Hamas and Lebanese Hizbollah
organizations  to  bolster  its  claim as  an  opponent  to  –  and to  strengthen its
position in negotiations with – its Israeli neighbor.84 Finally there are the Islamic
movements  that  had  become  stronger  due  to  the  relative  opening  to  Salafi
79Gladstone, Rick. “As Syria Opposition Unifies, Unrest Intensifies at Borders.” New York Times, November 
12, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/13/world/middleeast/syria-war-updates.html 
80Bilefsky, Dan. “Factional Splits Hinder Drive to Topple Syria’s Assad.” The New York Times, December 8, 
2011, sec. World / Middle East. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/09/world/middleeast/faction-
al-splits-hinder-drive-to-topple-syrias-assad.html. 
81First signs seem encouraging, see: Landis, Joshua. “New Syrian Leadership Electrifies Opposition: Ten Coun-
tries Promise Recognition.” Syria Comment. Accessed November 19, 2012. http://ww  w.joshualandis.com/blog/?
p=16696. 
82For a short analysis on this topic, see: International Crisis Group. “Syria Under Bashar (I): Foreign Policy 
Challenges - International Crisis Group,” February 11, 2004. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-
north-africa/egypt-syria-lebanon/syria/023-syria-under-bashar-1-foreign-policy-challenges.aspx.
83 Interview with Kurdish opposition activist, DATE #, Brussels, Belgium. 
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groups in the wake of the American invasion of Iraq. They often had links to
foreign groups as they had sent fighters to Iraq before facing renewed repression
by a Syrian regime fearful of an American backlash.85
During the months (and years) of the uprising almost all of these groups
took up specific positions within the conflict. This was perhaps the least true for
Hamas: they chose to remain relatively uninvolved, distancing themselves from
the regime while retaining ties to Iran by quietly leaving Syria during the first
year of the uprising.86 On the other side a Palestinian fringe party (the Popular
Front  for  the  Liberation  of  Palestine-General  Command,  or  PFLP-GC)
continued  to  support  the  regime  –  and  actively  aided  the  repression  of
Palestinians living in those Syrian camps that came out to support the uprising.87
An intra-Palestinian conflict  was the result,  and escalated  as Damascus was
attacked in  July  and November  2012.88 Hizbollah  also  chose  to  support  the
Syrian regime as it felt it  needed its Syrian ally to continue its fight against
Israel.  Early stories that  Hizbollah fighters were supporting the Syrian army
proved correct when a number of Hizbollah fighters were killed inside Syria in
April  2012.89 Concerning the  Kurds  the  relations  with,  and presence  in,  the
conflict, foreign Kurdish parties (mainly the PKK and the Iraqi KDP) became
increasingly pronounced as Syrian troops withdrew from Kurdish areas. This
created an unstable situation where the Syrian conflict could easily spill over
into both Turkey and Iraq.90 Finally, as the conflict became more violent and
militias emerged,  conservative Islamic groups also became more pronounced
amongst  the Syrian opposition (see above).91 In this context  more and more
foreign jihadi fighters began to see Syria as a battleground against an apostate
84 International Crisis Group. “Syria Under Bashar (I): Foreign Policy Challenges - International Crisis Group,” 
February 11, 2004.
85McGregor, Andrew. “Controversial Syrian Preacher Abu al-Qaqa Gunned Down in Aleppo - The Jamestown 
Foundation.” Terrorism Focus, October 16, 2007. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?
no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=4481 
86Farrell, Stephen. “Leader of Hamas Makes Rare Trip to Jordan.” The New York Times, January 29, 2012, sec. 
World / Middle East. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/30/world/middleeast/lead-
er-of-hamas-makes-rare-trip-to-jordan.html. 
87Syria War Triggers Rifts in Palestinian Camps in Lebanon.” The New York Times, April 4, 2012, sec. World / 
Middle East. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/05/world/middleeast/05iht-m05-lebanon-camp.html. Kershner, 
Isabel. “Fighters Shoot Protesters at a Palestinian Camp in Syria.” The New York Times, June 7, 2011, sec. 
World / Middle East. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/08/world/middleeast/08damascus.html. 
88 Macfarquhar, Neil. “Syrian Rebels Claim to Kill Dozens of Soldiers.” New York Times, November 5, 2012. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/06/world/middleeast/Syria.html?pagewanted=all. 
89Barnard, Anne. “Hezbollah’s Syria Policy Puts It at Risk.” The New York Times, April 5, 2012, sec. World / 
Middle East. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/06/world/middleeast/hezbollahs-syria-policy-puts-it-at-risk.html.
See also: Macfarquhar, Neil. “Lebanon’s Shiites and Sunnis Fight in Syria, but Not at Home.” New York Times, 
December 19, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/world/middleeast/lebanons-shiites-and-sun-
nis-fight-in-syria-but-not-at-home.html?hp&_r=0. 
90 Arango, Tim. “Kurds to Pursue More Autonomy in a Fallen Syria.” New York Times, September 28, 2012. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/29/world/middleeast/kurds-to-pursue-more-autonomy-in-a-fallen-syria.html?
pagewanted=all. 
91Rosen, Nir. “Islamism and the Syrian Uprising.” Foreign Policy, March 8, 2012. http://mideast.foreignpolicy.-
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regime  –  and  began  traveling  to  Syria.92 Many  within  the  opposition  were
opposed to their involvement as it provided the regime with the opportunity to
describe the uprising as extremist, but often felt they were left with no other
choice as few other foreign countries had come to the aid of the uprising in any
military sense.93 
Third, some relations between Syria and groups outside its borders were
influenced  by  the  uprising.  Personal  and  cultural  linkages  have  always
transgressed Syrian borders. Though most extreme in the case of Lebanon – to
the extent that Lebanon is perceived as part of Syria by some Syrians – this is
also true of communities in the Antakya region in Turkey and at the borders
with Jordan and Iraq. Antakya (the region borders Syria in the North-West) is a
mostly Alawi region and many of its inhabitants side with the Syrian regime. As
more and more Sunni Syrians – and specifically  Sunni rebels – flooded the
region tensions arose, though they were effectively contained by Turkey.94 In
Lebanon these tensions were more pronounced95 due to the sectarian nature of
the Lebanese political system and the close connections it has with the Syrian
polity.  Hezbollah (pro-Syrian regime) currently controls the political  system,
but the Sunni groups of Sa'ad Hariri (anti-Syrian regime) have been emboldened
by  the  ongoing  uprising  against  Bashar.  As  a  result  political  and  sectarian
divisions  polarized.96 In  the  northern  Lebanese  city  of  Tripoli97 sectarian
tensions  came  to  a  head  in  June  and  August  2012  when  Sunni  and  Alawi
communities clashed. Dozens died.98 
Lastly, there is the influence of the international political community. The
international community attempted to resolve the ever-escalating conflict, but
diverging  views  on  the  need  for  regime  change  frustrated  any  coherent
92 Macfarquhar, Neil, and Hwaida Saad. “As Syrian War Drags On, Jihad Gains Foothold.” The New York 
Times, July 29, 2012, sec. World / Middle East. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/30/world/middleeast/as-syri-
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93Ibid. 
94Gettleman, Jeffrey. “Syria’s Conflict Intrudes on Antakya, Turkey.” New York Times, July 28, 2012. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/29/world/middleeast/syrias-conflict-intrudes-on-antakya-turkey.html?page-
wanted=all. 
95Wood, Josh. “Syria’s Unrest Seeps Into Lebanon.” The New York Times, May 4, 2011, sec. World / Middle 
East. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/05/world/middleeast/05iht-M05-SYRIA-REFUGEES.html. 
96 Wood, Josh. “Lebanese Fear Syria’s Violence May Spill Over.” The New York Times, November 9, 2011, sec. 
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97 Not to be confused with the Libyan capital that bears the same name. 
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international response. International attempts at finding a resolution have been
marked by the lack of consensus within the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) where Russia  has  vetoed any (US,  French and British)  attempts  at
formulating a binding resolution against the Syrian regime.99 The most these
attempts have achieved to date was a temporary truce in April 2012 that UN
observers helped to implement. Although a decrease in hostilities was observed
at first, the ceasefire did not hold and the conflict eventually escalated further.100
Other UN based peace plan has been unsuccessful in getting any kind of project
or  road  map  in  place  (a  recent  “Eid  ceasefire”  did  not  materialize  for
instance).101 As a result international engagement has mostly taken place outside
the UN framework: either bilaterally or through regional organizations. 
Foreign countries have increasingly supported either  the regime or the
opposition through financial means or by providing (heavy) weapons. Russia
and Iran are supporting the regime – and are providing it with weapons.102 Saudi
Arabia  and  Qatar  (both  as  governments  and  in  a  more  decentralized  sense
through  wealthy  families)  are  supporting  the  rebels.  This  support  is  often
directed to conservative Islamic (Salafi) groups. Turkey supports the Muslim
Brotherhood via the Syrian National Council,  but is finding that the Muslim
Brotherhood enjoys little support or connections on the ground in Syria.103 The
US and Western powers are increasingly vocal in their opposition to the Syrian
regime – and openly call for the fall of the president – but are hesitant to support
the opposition directly with arms due to endemic corruption and the increasing
power of Salafi-Jihadi groups in the country.104 
At the time of writing the conflict continues to escalate, the death toll in
November 2012 was around 40.000.105  
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http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/16/world/middleeast/russia-denies-shipping-new-helicopters-to-syria.html. 
101 Al Jazeera English. “Interview: Syria Peace Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi - Middle East -.” Al Jazeera English, 
September 20, 2012. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/09/2012920731664541.html. 
102 Kramer, Andrew E. “Russia Sending Air and Sea Defenses to Syria.” New York Times, June 15, 2012. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/16/world/europe/russia-sending-air-and-sea-defenses-to-syria.html. 
103 According to Syrian Interviewees in Antakya (Turkey) September 2012. 
104 Worth, Robert F. “Citing U.S. Fears, Arab Allies Limit Aid to Syrian Rebels.” New York Times, October 6, 
2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/07/world/middleeast/citing-us-fears-arab-allies-limit-aid-to-syri-
an-rebels.html?pagewanted=all. 
105Number according to www.syrianshuhada.com. As they tend to overestimate their death toll, I round the num-
ber downwards. On 2 January 2013 a United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OH-
CHR) commissioned report was published which placed the death toll much higher at around 59.648 deaths. In 
my opinion the methodology used in the OHCHR report is not sufficient to warrant this exact number. But it 
does seem likely that the actual number of casualties was (far) higher than 40.000 by November 2011. See: 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/SY/PreliminaryStatAnalysisKillingsInSyria.pdf  
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In conclusion we can state that Syria has always been deeply embedded
in the conflicts playing out in the region – and that this has rendered the current
conflict highly complex. In fact, part of the former Syrian President Hafez al-
Asad’s strategy was to play a more powerful role in the international political
arena (see section on “structural conditions”). It might be argued that this, in the
end, remains the strategy now. By pushing for the disintegration of the Syrian
nation, some argue, the President will become indispensable in stabilizing the
country – or  at  least  an indispensable  part  of  a  peace deal  between various
warring factions.106 In addition, internal conflict will buy the president time: as
long as various groups are fighting each other they are not fighting the Syrian
regime. To properly understand the dynamics described in this section, we have
to consider the structural conditions present within the country and the resulting
(political) opportunities and threats for mobilization. This will be done in the
following two sections. 
Structural conditions 
The following section  will  focus  on the historical  emergence  of  the  current
Syrian political regime and provide an overview of social divisions within the
country. In doing so, it will also provide descriptions of key historical events
that contributed to shape the dynamics at the intersections of these political and
social  characteristics.  The section after  – contingent political  opportunities –
will provide a more detailed layout of the practical impacts of these various
dynamics  on  perceptions  of  opportunities  and  threats,  and  of  the  strategies
available to actors in both the regime and the opposition. 
General Background
Syria is positioned on the Eastern side of the Mediterranean and has borders
with Turkey in the North, Iraq in the East, Jordan in the South and Lebanon and
Palestine in the West (see also the map in Appendix A). The country itself is
inhabited by a  high number of  various religious and cultural  groups,  giving
Syrian society sectarian (in Arabic: ta'ifiya) undertones.107 Kurds live mainly in
the North, in addition to a large minority of Palestinian and Armenian refugees.
There  are  Christians  of  all  denominations  (different  types  of  Orthodox  and
Catholics), Druze, Sunnis, Shiites, Alawi, Ismaeli (the latter two are officially
Shiite denominations) and a few small communities of Jews. Sunni Arabs form
106 See also: ICG. Popular Protest in North Africa and The Middle East (VII): The Syrian Regime’s Slow-motion
Suicide - International Crisis Group, July 13, 2011. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-
africa/iraq-syria-lebanon/syria/109-popular-protest-in-north-africa-and-the-middle-east-vii-the-syrian-re-
gimes-slow-motion-suicide.aspx. 
107While understanding that in sociology the term “sect” and “sectarianism” often have different meanings, the 
term sectarianism is widely used in (Arab) regional studies and specifically Syria to denote a socially clearly 
defined (religious) group that has a high degree of internal organization. The word “sect” is used in this report in
this sense. Sectarianism denotes the social process in which boundaries between various sects polarize.  
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the majority (about 65 per cent) followed by Shiites. Christians make up about
ten  per  cent  of  the  population  (CIA,  2007).  Syria  is  generally  a  religiously
conservative  society,  although  economic  and  political  elites  are  often  more
Western oriented and hold more liberal world views. 
Asad Rule Emerges
Most of the dynamics in the ongoing uprising have their historical roots in the
emergence of the current regime in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Hafez al-
Asad (b. 1930 – d. 2000), the father of the current president Bashar al-Asad,
emerged as the ruler of Syria in 1970. At the start of his rule, Hafez al-Asad’s
power was built on an extremely small popular base – coming as he did from an
Alawi rural background (Perthes 1992). To stabilize his personal rule within the
army and key security positions he overtly depended on informal relations (or
asabiya) in his own tribe and family (R. A Hinnebusch 2001).108 As a result
Alawis  came  to  dominate  the  armed  forces  and  security  services.  Thus,  to
understand  the  power  structures  of  the  Syrian  regime  the  “normal”  state
institutions (president, government, parliament [or People's Assembly], security
services  and  army)  matter  –  though  mostly  insofar  as  they  are  part  of  an
informal power structure forming the basis of the authoritarian regime (Zisser
1998). For instance, the main security services (political, military, air force and
general) and their various branches act almost completely independently from
the judicial system and also operate prisons independently (ICG 2004, fn. 10). 
Additionally,  Bashar  used  the  Ba'ath  party  as  a  tool  for  state-induced
clientelism. The rural villages, before largely non-politicized, were unionized
from above following a corporatist logic implemented through the Ba'ath party.
The  army,  intelligence  services  and  Ba’ath  party  organizations  became
instruments for institutionalized corruption in which powerful patrons secured
support from lower ranking members via a highly developed clientelist system
(Perthes  1997).  Wasta  (having  connections)  became  the  prime  vehicle  for
achieving economic and political success (R. A Hinnebusch 1995, 314–315). In
this context the military developed into a main political and economic player
(Mora and Wiktorowicz 2003, 109).  There is no effective oversight  of these
institutions,  and  stories  of  corruption  within  security  forces  have  abounded
since the early days of the regime (Batatu 1982). An extreme example of state
institutionalized corruption is the drug cartels of the late 1970s that, in return for
allegiance to and (both financial and armed) support for the regime, were tacitly
allowed to form semi-militias and run their drug businesses between Lebanon
and Syria. Due to their clandestine nature they were soon called “shabiha” or
“ghosts” (Salih 2012). 
108In the 1980s the important names in Syria were the brother of the president and chief of the siraya al-difa' 
(Defence Forces) Rifa’at al-Asad; chairman of the Presidential Intelligence committee and chief of air intelli-
gence Muhammad al-Khawli; and the head of military intelligence 'Ali Dubah. All these individuals are Alawis 
and from Asad's tribe (Batatu 1982).
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In  an  attempt  to  overcome  the  sectarian  backlash  this  might  involve,
Hafez al-Asad took pains to placate various minorities, and the Sunni majority.
A number of Christians, Ismaelis and Sunnis were given high-ranking - but non-
influential - positions within the army and political bodies (Kelidar 1973, 17).
The Sunni elite classes - now sidelined from real political influence - were in
addition economically tied to the new regime; for instance by leaving control of
the Chamber of Commerce in their hands (Batatu 1982; R. A Hinnebusch 2001).
But nothing could hide the fact that the Sunni bourgeoisie had lost out on both
political and economic power after the Ba'ath and Hafez's ascent to power. 
The 1979-1982 Islamic Uprising
These above mentioned attempts seemed effective and Syria under Hafez was
reasonably stable. But in the mid 1970s Syria was hit by a severe economic
recession  (Perthes  1997,  23–36)  and  the  state  reacted  with  liberalization
(infitah)  policies  which  saw  companies  privatized  and  a  new  commercial
bourgeoisie created (Perthes 1997, 50–58). Individuals close to the regime used
their advantageous political positions to capitalize on these new infitah policies.
Through their relations they gained near monopolies in specific economic fields
and  created  an  elitist  economic  position  for  themselves  and  their  families
(Perthes 1992, 124). Economic disparities within society were growing wider. 
It was in this general context that a domestic opposition to the regime
emerged.  Although from the outset  opposition to  the Hafez regime took the
shape of a unified structure of various parties and (urban) labor unions, soon the
most prominent movement was the Islamic one:109 the religious frame had great
resonance  within  Syrian  society,  in  addition  to  the  fact  that  mosques  and
religious institutions provided a well developed institutional structure for the
emergence of a broad based movement. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood was its
main embodiment, but many other movements were present – though dividing
lines were often hard to make out. From 1973 onwards these movements started
to frame their conflict with the Ba'ath party as a fight against Alawi minority
rule. By focusing on the Alawi sect the movement hoped to galvanize support
but ended up isolating itself from other religious minorities and secular groups
(Lobmayer 1995, 199).
The  uprising  climaxed  in  February  1982 in  the  city  of  Hama.  Where
Mujahedeen (Islamist fighters) provoked the army – although accounts differ –
into a violent response. Soon the mujahedeen had forced all government troops
out of the city and proclaimed the city 'liberated' (Lobmayer 1995, 323–324).
Regime troops closed all roads into the city, cut off electricity and phone lines –
and  started  shelling.  At  the  height  of  the  battle  for  Hama,  Sa'id  Hawwa,  a
spiritual leader from Hama and the successor of Marwan Hadid, called on all
109For an exhaustive account of the 1979-82 uprising see: Abd-allah (1982), Lobmeyer (1995)and Ziadeh (2008).
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Syrians to strike. He had no success: the next day, everyone outside Hama went
to work as usual. The regime’s hands thus freed, it focused all its attention on
the city. Civilian quarters were shelled and whole families were shot, even after
the town of Hama was pacified (Seale 1988, 333). Estimates of the death toll
range from 5,000 to 40,000 civilians, thousands of regime soldiers and about
five hundred mujahideen. Soon after the Islamic uprising in Syria was crushed
(Lobmayer 1995, 325–327 fn. 152). 
The uprising had turned out to be a complete failure. As a result of its
increasingly Islamic and Sunni focus, Hafez al-Asad had been able to isolate the
uprising within one societal sect and one part of the country: specifically the
city of Hama that is predominantly (conservative) Sunni Muslim. He was able
to  repress  the  uprising  effectively  –  leveling  the  city  center  in  the  process.
Anyone belonging to the Muslim Brothers (a catch-all phrase for any Syrian
Islamist)  faced  the  death  penalty.110 Islamic  political  movements  within  the
country itself were destroyed and seemingly ceased to exist (see also Ziadeh
2008).111 Syrian Islamists found themselves rooted out of their home country
and scattered across the Arab world and Europe.112 The non-Islamist opposition
that had been at the inception of the uprising – mainly the urban-based unions –
were  pacified  and  incorporated  into  a  national  Ba'thist  union  structure
(Raymond A. Hinnebusch 1993).
International relations
Before  continuing  it  is  instructive  to  briefly  consider  Syrian  international
relations during this period. Throughout the three decades of his rule, Hafez al-
Asad's regional politics were marked by a combination of strategic pragmatism
and often antagonistic relations with Syria’s direct neighbors. Concerning Israel,
he tried to achieve military parity through Soviet military assistance, aiming to
pressure Israel into returning the Golan heights, lost in 1967. He changed his
strategy when the Soviet Union collapsed and engaged with Israel through US-
led  negotiations  without  result  before  his  death  in  2000.  Syria  remained
formally  at  war  with  Israel,  did  not  recognize  the  country  and  hosted  most
Palestinian resistance movements,  including Hamas,  the PLO and PFLP-GC,
thus strengthening its importance (and position) as a negotiation partner in a
possible Palestinian-Israeli peace deal. 
Concerning Lebanon, Syria sent troops to the country in 1976 within the
110The law stipulating the death penalty for Muslim Brothers (law no. 42 from 1980) is still in effect. For a prac-
tical example see: Syrian Human Rights Committee. “The Ruling on Youngster Amr Hiyaan ar-Razuq, Under 
the Provision of Law No. 49-1980 (Arabic),” January 9, 2010. http://www.shrc.org/data/aspx/d18/4048.aspx. 
111This did not only concern the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafist and Hizb al-Tahrir activists were also repressed 
and exiled. In addition, any religious institutes that had supported the uprising - or whose students had supported
the uprising - were dismantled: examples are the Abi Dharr and Jama't Midan groups and the Zayd movement 
(Pierret 2009, 3). Hundreds of shayks and 'ulama (religious scholars) were exiled. 
112For an insider view of this process see the five volumes by Adnan Sa'ad ad-Din ``The Syrian Muslim Brother-
hood: Memos and Memoirs'' (Arabic), 2006, Dar Ammar (Amman).
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framework of an Arab “peacekeeping” army during the then recently started
Lebanese civil war. They never left, and Syria became an increasingly important
player in Lebanese politics. Lebanon’s fragmented political structure and close
national and cultural linkages to Syria made it an ideal context for symbiotic
political  and economic  relationships  between elites  in  both countries  –  with
Syria the more powerful party. When the Lebanese civil war ended in 1990 and
the Lebanese construction tycoon Rafiq Hariri returned from Saudi Arabia to
Lebanon, Syria supported his presidency as he proved an ideal actor to open up
corrupt construction deals – a huge market was to be had in the reconstruction
of war-ravaged Lebanon. At the same time they supported Hizbollah, shipping
Iranian  weapons  to  southern  Lebanon,  and  thereby  further  increasing  their
importance as a negotiation partner to Israel and gaining legitimacy as one of
the last Arab countries continuing armed opposition to Israel.
The Rule of Bashar
In June 2000 Bashar al-Asad became the president of Syria following the death
of his father president Hafez al-Asad.113 Bashar embodied a promise of a new
era. In the first year of his rule a relative liberalization of the political sphere
took  place  and  initial  changes  in  government  seemed  to  imply  a  focus  on
technocrats that would support regime reforms (Perthes 2004). The immediate
effect was a short-lived period in 2001 – dubbed the “Damascus spring” – in
which more civil  and political  freedoms seemed imminent.  When opposition
figures  started  to  demand substantial  political  reforms,  however,  the  regime
backtracked and many activists were jailed. 
The  “Damascus  spring”  would  prove  to  be  only  the  first  episode  of
relative instability in the country: over the next ten years Syria lurched from one
crisis to the next. In 2003 the U.S. invaded Iraq. After the invasion Syria was
accused by the US and its allies of aiding Jihadi insurgent groups in the country,
and international political isolation was the result.114 Next the Syrian regime was
sent  into  turmoil  following  the  murder  of  former  Lebanese  president  Rafiq
Hariri (2005). After Rafiq Hariri had become increasingly frustrated with new
Syrian policies in Lebanon, he pushed for more Lebanese independence. As a
result relations with Syria had been extremely strained until he was killed by a
car bomb on 14 February 2005. An initial UN inquiry suspected Syrian (and
Hizbollah)  involvement,  strongly  denied  by  the  regime  itself.  The  head  of
Syria's  security  apparatus  in  Lebanon  (and  Minister  of  the  Interior),  Ghazi
Kanaan,  committed suicide a  few months later  just  two hours after  denying
113New York Times. “Syria Human Rights Advocate Welcomes New Leader’s Reforms.” New York Times, 
December 17, 2000. http://www.  nytimes.com/2000/12/17/world/syria-human-rights-advocate-wel-
comes-new-leader-s-reforms.html. 
114The Associated Press. “Iraq Sends Thousands of Police to Syria Border to Stop Insurgents.” The New York 
Times, September 5, 2009, sec. International / Middle East. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/05/world/middleeast/05iraq.html. 
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allegations of  having spoken to UN investigators.115 As a  direct  result  Syria
retreated from Lebanon, lost many lucrative business deals in the country and
became even more isolated in the international political sphere. It also lost - for
a period at least  -  its  influence over its direct  neighbor. Syria’s international
isolation only decreased after French president Nicolas Sarkozy invited Bashar
al-Asad to join his newly initiated Union for the Mediterranean in July 2008.116
Throughout  this  period,  as  will  be  discussed  in  the  next  section,  domestic
perceptions of opportunities for mobilization rose and fell inversely to Syria's
international political isolation.117
Despite these crises and the new leadership, the authoritarian regime itself
changed little. Even while most individuals in the upper political echelons have
been replaced, the ways in which these key individuals gain and exercise their
power has remained the same (Perthes 2004, 9). The synthesis of political and
economic spheres that emerged under Hafez remained, with the children of key
actors taking over their parents’ positions from the mid-1990 onwards. All these
actors  have  vested  (economic)  interests  in  the  maintenance  of  the  regime.
Despite calls for battling against corruption, the latter has thrived under Bashar.
The structural context before the uprising can thus be summarized as follows: 
 The country was marked by religious and ethnic divisions, with around
16 different  sects  present.  Although the  state  and its  institutions  were
explicitly national, the spread of political power was unevenly distributed
along sectarian and clan lines, favoring the Alawi sect of the President
and, to a certain extent, other minorities. 
 An informal structure of regime power built on family and tribal links,
and institutionally focused around army and intelligence services.  Any
dissent, especially Islamic, harshly and effectively repressed. 
 Close  integration  between  (informal)  political  power  and  economic
power.  Those  at  the  top  of  the  political  regime  profited  greatly  from
infitah policies. Therefore a clear disconnect between political-economic
elites and the rest of society emerged. 
115 See for instance: Almustaqbal. “Ghazi Kanaan Commits Suicide in His Office by Shouting Himself in the 
Mouth.” Almustaqbal Newspaper, October 13, 2005. http://www.almustaqbal.com/storiesv4.aspx?
storyid=145695. as-Sharq al-Awsat. “Ghazi Kanaan Gives His ‘Last’ Declaration to the Radio Station ‘Voice of 
Lebanon’: What New TV Showed Was Meant to Offend Us and Minister Hariri.” as-Sharq al-Awsat, October 
13, 2005. http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?article=328099&issueno=9816; and as-Sharq al-Awsat. “ ةياهن
ىـــــلولا ,مفلا يف ةصاصر .. ناعنك.” as-Sharq al-Awsat, October 13, 2005. http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?sec-
tion=1&issueno=9816&article=328163&search=%D3%E6%D1%ED%C7&state=true. 
116Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA). “Union for the Mediterranean Summit Kicks Off with the Participation of
President al-Assad SANA , Syria.” Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), July 13, 2008. 
http://sana.sy/eng/183/2008/07/13/183894.htm.
117In 2009 the entire leadership behind the Damascus declaration was arrested. See: Levant News. “ يف وضع لاقتعا
مايأ ةتس ذنم قشمد نلعل ينطولا سلجملا”, November 20, 2009. 
http://www.thisissyria.net/2009/11/20/syriatoday/03.html. Concerning Islamic Mobilization (and Abu Dzar) Le-
vant News. “  نجسب ماكحأ16 نيب امل صمح يف ’رذ يبأ دجسم ةعومجم‘ نم  انطاوم 8و 12ةنس ”, December 2, 2009. 
http://www.thisissyria.net/2009/12/02/syriatoday/03.html. 
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 The country has always had influence on various important conflicts in
the region. This is true of the Israeli-Arab conflict, but particularly the
US-Iraq conflict and internal Lebanese affairs.
During the uprising all these factors played a role, albeit at different times and
stages. The direct contingent political opportunities, and how they developed
over time, will be discussed in the next section. 
Contingent Political Opportunities
Contingent political opportunities show how the structural conditions described
above  form  the  backdrop  for  quickly  changing  perceptions  of  fear  and
opportunity among protesters both before and during the uprising. They provide
insights  as  to  how structural  conditions  interlink  with  the  dynamics  of  the
uprising described in the section on protest. The contingent opportunities and
threats  are  discussed following the  different  phases  as  described in  the  first
section of this report.
Phase 0: Pre-uprising
Concerning “traditional” political opportunities (operationalized for instance as
party alliances,  divisions in the political  elites,  emergence of potential  allies
within the political sphere, contested elections), there were no openings to speak
of before the uprising. This is not to say that no changes took place: in the
decade before the uprising there was a perceived opening following the ascent
of the current president, which subsequently closed. This closure was followed
by international isolation and the perceived weakness of the regime. But in the
two years before the uprising the Syrian regime had clawed back its position on
the international political stage, and was recognized as playing a decisive role in
various  neighboring  conflicts.  It  could  therefore  fully  repress  any  internal
dissent. Opposition movements unified in either loose “declaration” structures
or became irrelevant or fell apart. Any social mobilization (critical of the regime
critical or otherwise) had to have some form of informal relation with regime
actors  –  if  only to  know what was going on within the various intelligence
services so as to know if repressive measures were to be expected.
When looking for a reason as to why the Syrian uprising did eventually
emerge, the main trigger identified is cognitive: the signaling effect from the
uprisings and sudden “revolutions” in Tunisia and Egypt. The cross-sectional
nature  of  the  uprisings  in  both  these  Arab  countries  and  their  non-violent
methods created the perception that Syrian citizens had both the means and the
possibility to build a cross-sectional uprising in their own country. In addition,
the exceptionality of the moment was widely recognized. In 30 years no event
had  resonated  with  so  many  different  groups  within  Syrian  society
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simultaneously: it was either now, or Syria might have to wait another 30 years.
Small  groups  throughout  the  country  continued  their  attempts  to  start
mobilization and/or express their  frustration at  the Syrian regime throughout
February  2011.  But  none  ignited  nationwide  outrage.  This  did  eventually
happen when the  group of  youngsters  was  arrested  and tortured  in  Dara'.118
Though the initiation of the protests was mostly due to a cognitive signal from
revolutions  in  fellow Arab  states,  to  explain  how specific  opportunities  and
threats  evolved  during  the  uprising  we  need  to  turn  to  more  structural
characteristics  as  discussed in  the previous  section.  The development  of  the
peaceful  uprising into violence and increased foreign involvement  is  closely
related to structural characteristics of Syrian regime, state and society. 
Phase 1: Non-violent Repertoires
Pre-existing Syrian (socio-political) structures influenced the dynamics of the
uprising in a number of ways. First,  the core pillars of the regime remained
stable throughout the uprising. The close connections between regime, security
services  and  army  –  indeed  it  may  be  said  that  the  army  and  intelligence
services  are  the regime – mean that many within these organizations have a
direct interest in maintaining the regime. Stronger still, as many within the top
echelons of power are Alawi, they fear the return of Sunni dominance as before
the 1960s. Many feel they are fighting for their own survival – and will go to
any lengths to defend their group.119 As repression mounted – and Sunni feelings
of vengeance towards Alawis increased – this effect  was exacerbated.  Some
regime supporters, by and large from (Alawi) minorities, were given weapons to
“defend” their towns. Pro-regime militias were the result, and were soon named
after regime related militias long forgotten: the Shabiha – Ghosts – of the 1970s.
Not  now  involved  in  the  drug  trade,  they  became  a  crucial  tool  in  the
application of repressive measures across the nation. 
Second,  the  actual  implementation  of  repression was marked  by  stark
differences  between  different  army  divisions  and  intelligence  services.  With
formal  state  institutions  subservient  to  informal  allocations  of  power,  some
intelligence  services  and  army  divisions  are  near  states-within-states.  Some
have  immense  resources  –  for  instance  the  fourth  division  under  Bashar’s
brother Maher – while the regular army has almost none. The initial campaign
against  Homs (in  May 2011)  was carried  out  by  the  fourth  division  led  by
Maher al-Asad and marked by its  professionalism, while in other campaigns
more  “regular”  army  divisions  were  used  and  repression  was  seemingly
118 Macleod, Hugh. “Inside Deraa.” al-Jazeera, April 19, 2011. 
http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/features/2011/04/201141918352728300.html. 
119 ICG. Popular Protest in North Africa and The Middle East (VII): The Syrian Regime’s Slow-motion Suicide - 
International Crisis Group, July 13, 2011, p.10.  http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-
africa/iraq-syria-lebanon/syria/109-popular-protest-in-north-africa-and-the-middle-east-vii-the-syrian-re-
gimes-slow-motion-suicide.aspx. 
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random.120 With the emergence of Alawi-dominated militias, these differences
increased  as  these  “shabiha”  were  often  accused  of  perpetrating  the  most
random and deadly acts of violence in various mobilized areas of Syria.121 To
what extent  the violent  reactions were orchestrated by political  elites  or  not
remained somewhat unclear at the start of the uprising. In personal meetings the
president would claim ignorance.122 But all of the above fed the perception that
the regime had a survival logic of its own and could not be negotiated with. 
Third,  the  complete  lack  of  any  institutional  framework  for  social
mobilization before the start of the uprising meant that mobilization emerged
around pre-existing social and religious institutions: mosques, clans and family
ties. Thus we can note that pre-existing tribal and clan ties structured the early
dynamics of the uprising, with families and clan members taking to the streets
in the first weeks of the uprising in Dara'. We also see that protests emerged
after (Friday) prayers,123 as the only occasion on which large groups of people
could gather without being immediately arrested. Religious leaders were also
forced  to  take  sides  in  the  uprising,  due  to  the  importance  of  religious
institutions as mobilization structures. At the same time, the uprising itself was
explicitly non-religious (protesters were not making any “Islamic” demands, as
the previous (1979-82) uprising had shown the dangers of an uprising falling
into the “sectarian trap”.
Phase 2: Violent Repertoires
As in phase 1, a combination of cognitive signaling from a fellow Arab state –
this time Libya – combined with structurally influenced dynamics of regime
repression also shaped the perception of opportunities and threats now. These
perceptions  concerned  general  mobilization,  but  more  specifically  what
repertoires to use. From the very beginning, in March 2011, discussions had
been held among opposition forces on the desirability and potential of drawing
on a violent protest repertoire. Though some activists took a principled stance
against the use of violence, most denounced its use due to their perceptions of
opportunity: they could never effectively fight the Syrian regime as it had more
120 Ibid, p.10-13.  
121 Landis, Joshua. “Military Casualties Rise; President Spreech; Houla.” Syria Comment, June 4, 2012. 
http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=14859. See also: http://syrianshuhada.com/default.asp?a=st&st=3. 
122 Slackman, Michael. “Syria Tries to Ease Deep Political Crisis.” The New York Times, March 27, 2011, sec. 
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weapons, was better trained and would have the legitimacy – if protesters used
violent  repertoires  –  to  use  full  force  in  repressing  the  uprising.  A marked
change within these discussions took place in July and August with the result
that a majority now began to see armed struggle not only as desirable but also as
necessary and possible. 
 There  are  a  few reasons  for  this  change.  First,  and  rather  ironically,
increased repression provided a sense of opportunity as it increased the number
of  defections  from the  army.  As  regime  repression  had  increased  so,  albeit
slowly,  had the number  of  defections.124 The hoped for  turning point  in this
respect  seemed  to  come  on  June  6  when  –  according  to  protesters  –  mass
defections ended with civilians and defectors taking over the town of Jisr al-
Shourough and burning the local police station. The town would only remain
outside regime control for a week: in the morning of 12 June,  after days of
shelling, the fourth division overran the town.125 Diplomats also began defect to
an  increasing  extent.126 Though  the  number  of  army  defections  remained
limited,  what  it  did  provide  was  a  source  of  military  expertise  that  in  turn
increased perceptions that violent mobilization was a viable option. 
Second,  the  perception  that  a  non-violent  repertoire  was  not  effective
enough grew over time. The idea was that regime legitimacy would collapse as
result of the violent repression of non-violent mobilization – as seen in Tunisia
and Egypt. Protesters saw Ramadan as a real opportunity to enlarge protests. In
the days and weeks ahead of Ramadan regime repression gradually increased,
hitting  its  worst  point  on  the  first  day  of  Ramadan  when  138  people  were
killed.127 Hama and Deir  ez-Zor  were  surrounded,  shelled  and then invaded
(both around 5 August 2011),128 Idlib and Latakya would suffer the same fate in
the  days  leading up to  Ramadan.  Yet  no  meaningful  schism between  army,
security  services  and  the  political  regime  appeared:  they  were  too  closely
interlinked in the Syrian context. Defections never threatened the integrity of
core  parts  of  the  army or  the  regime.  The large  majority  of  defectors  were
Sunni,  and  among the  higher  ranks  solely  Sunni.  This  meant  that  the  most
powerful  sections of the army and intelligence services – positions filled by
Alawis – remained fully under the control of the regime.129 This again seemed to
show the relative ineffectiveness of non-violent protest repertoires in the Syrian
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context. The regime would use any means to repress protests, irrespective of
whether they were peaceful or not, and seemed to get away with it. 
Due to the above, the position of adherents to non-violent protest tactics
within the uprising gradually weakened. But the real “tipping-point” was 22
August 2011: when a Libyan opposition attack on the country’s capital proved
an enormous success. From an opposition force pummeled by the regime – as
was the case in Syria – the Libyan opposition had transformed into an effective
armed uprising that was able, with help of NATO, to overrun Gaddafi's regime.
The attack on Tripoli sent shock waves through the opposition.130 It meant that
both the means – trained soldiers – were available, and a successful example.
Soon  proponents  for  a  purely  non-violent  uprising  found  themselves  in  the
minority. Militias “to defend the protesters” became more numerous and soon
after became an increasingly offensive force. 
A final  key  change  in  the  perceptions  of  threats  and  –  specifically  –
opportunities was came on 19 July 2012 when a large section of the regime’s
security elite was assassinated in a bomb attack in Damascus.131 This meant that
the very top of the regime was vulnerable and many in the opposition began to
boast that soon the president himself would be targeted. A surge in (violent)
mobilization was the immediate result,  which resulted in the attacks on both
Damascus  and  Aleppo,  and  subsequently  the  enlargement  of  the  armed
insurrection to a full scale civil war as all parts of the country were dragged into
armed strife.132 
Phase 3: Foreign Influence
Foreign  influence  became  more  pronounced  as  the  conflict  between  the
opposition and the government escalated. With it the perceptions of threats and
opportunities became increasingly linked to the international (political) sphere.
These  were  related  to  specific  bilateral  support  for  the  rebels  or  for  the
government, and depended on dynamics within the UN and more specifically its
Security Council. 
To start  with bilateral  support  for  the  regime,  it  was obvious to  most
Syrians that as long as there was support from both Russia and Iran (and to
some  extent  China)  for  the  Syrian  regime,  it  would  always  have  sufficient
resources  to  continue  its  repression.  As  it  became increasingly  obvious  that
there  would  not  be  any  meaningful  change  in  the  positions  of  these  two
countries vis-à-vis the uprising, the general perception of the political strength
129For en enlightening interactive overview of diplomatic defections, see: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/in-
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of the regime increased. This feeling was exacerbated by the fact that no large
scale  support  from the  US  or  Europe  materialized,  severely  hampering  the
effectiveness of the militias fighting the regular army. The very fact that the
opposition  is  a  non-state  actor  and  poorly  institutionalized  on  the  ground
renders  acquiring  support  from  foreign  actors  a  challenge,  increasing  the
perception of the strength of the regime and the threat to the uprising.133
At the same time the fact that various countries had a stake in the fall of
the Bashar  regime meant  that  the uprising did eventually  gain support  from
Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, strengthening the perception that the armed
opposition  was  both  necessary  and  possible.  Many  groups  –  specifically
conservative  Islamic  and  Salafi  groups  –  were  increasingly  successful  in
securing support from other (non-state) actors in the Gulf: mainly from Saudi
Arabia and Qatar. This helped to strengthen the perception that Islamist actors
have  a  decisive  advantage  over  secular  opposition  figures  –  thereby
automatically “Islamizing” the opposition. Many groups feign to be more pious
than they really are in order to secure the weapons needed for their militia.134 To
what extent the uprising is therefore really “Islamizing” remains hard to gauge
and will only become clear when both the opposition and its  support (in terms
of finances and arms) becomes better institutionalized. 
Actors in transition: Elites 
In the following section the most relevant (political) elites of the uprising are
discussed.  A short  description  is  provided  of  each,  and  crucial  actors  are
discussed  and  relevant  dynamics  explored.  As  no  relevant  institutionalized
social  elites existed before the uprising,  I  focus here on Politically Relevant
Elites (PREs). I do not provide a full mapping of these PREs (a task impossible
within the scope of this report), but opt instead for a preliminary outline of the
most important individuals.
Bashar al-Asad's Clique
This includes the president and his close (family) allies, who together form the
apex of the political regime and often hold positions within the most powerful
army  divisions  and  the  intelligence  services.  For  instance,  Maher  al-Asad,
brother of Bashar al-Asad, commands the fourth division of the Syrian army –
widely known as the best trained and maintained division. The division is also
known for the high percentages of Alawi and other minorities among its ranks.
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Another example is Asef Shawkat, the brother-in-law of Bashar, who was head
of the military intelligence and central in formulating the strategy to counter the
popular uprising. Finally, Hafez Makhluf, first cousin of Bashar, is the head of
the  Damascus  branch  of  the  General  Intelligence  Directorate  –  the  most
important intelligence branch in the country.135 These are just a few examples,
but they serve to make it clear that those with close family and clan ties to the
president tend to fill the most sensitive positions in the army and intelligence
services. No apparent divisions have emerged within this “inner circle” of the
political regime during the uprising thus far. This does not of course mean that
no divisions exist,136 but that if they are present they have been successfully
limited. The only publicly observed shock within this circle is represented by
the bomb attack of 18 July 2012 that killed Asef Shawkat.137 It is rumored that
Maher al-Asad was also wounded in the attack (apparently he lost a leg) but this
has not been confirmed.
PREs and the army and intelligence services
This is the “outer circle” of the regime elite, constituted by leaders and generals
from the army and intelligence services. I make a division between an “inner”
and “outer”  circle  here on the basis  of  kinship,  yet  in  reality  differences  in
influence between the two groups are incremental. Two examples in this group
are  Mohammad  al-Shaar,  current  minister  of  the  interior,  who  is  an  Alawi.
Another example is Jamil  Hassan,  head of the Syrian Air Force Intelligence
Directorate – also an Alawi, but from Homs. The latter was assassinated on 26
August  2012.138 Ali  Mamluk  succeeded  Hisham  Ikhtiar  as  director  of  the
National Security Bureau after the latter was killed in the 12 July 2012 bomb
attack. This directorate theoretically oversees all the intelligence services in the
country, but (as noted before) in practice the different intelligence services have
high degrees  of  autonomy.  Both  Ali  Mamluk and Hisham Ikhtiar  are  Sunni
Muslim. Another relevant Sunni elite actor is Manaf Tlass, a former Brigadier
General of the Syrian Republican Guard. He is the son of Mustapha Tlass, a
close friend of former president Hafez al-Asad. Manaf Tlass became a close
friend of Bashar al-Asad. All the names above are people that belong to the so-
called “inner circle”, but are not members of the actual regime leadership. They
all function as advisors to the president, but it is impossible to know exactly
135 Atassi, Asma. “Interactive: Tracking Syria’s Defections.” al-Jazeera, November 25, 2012. http://www.aljaz-
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137 Macfarquhar, Neil. “Bombing Kills Key Assad Aides as Syria Fighting Rages.” New York Times, July 18, 
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how much influence they have over crucial decision making.139
Not one Alawi member of these circles has defected since the beginning
of the uprising. The only real changes within these circles have resulted from
assassinations or defections by Sunni elites: most notably Manaf Tlass in July
2012.140 Overall the number of defections has been very limited (at the time of
writing  in  November  2012)  and the  overall  integrity  of  the  regime remains
intact. Together with economic interests and the influence of sectarian and clan
ties, the fear of what will happen if Sunni Syrians take over creates an incentive
to remain loyal to the regime.141
Economic Elites
A third relevant group is made up of those that have gained a central position in
Syria's economic life, mostly due to their informal (kinship) relations with the
political  regime.  These  “children  of  the  powerful”,  or  awlad  al-masu'lin  in
Arabic, became the beneficiaries of the new wave of Syrian infitah (economic
liberalization) policies in the 1990s. In the 2000s they gained wide recognition
throughout the country. The main example in this case is Bashar’s cousin, Rami
Makhlouf142 – the son of Adnan Makhluf, the former commander of the Syrian
Presidential Guard – he was able to use his close connections to the regime to
form  and  own,  among  others,  one  (of  the  two)  Syrian  mobile  telephone
companies  (Syriatel),  duty  free  shops  and hotel  chains,  thus  creating  a  vast
business empire. He reportedly used his contacts within the intelligence services
(including his younger brother) to harass rivals out of the market.143 Another
example is Firas Tlass, another brother of Manaf Tlass, who created a business
empire due to his father’s friendship with Hafez al-Asad.144
Many  of  these  economic  elites  were  lightning  rods  for  discontent
throughout the uprising. Rami Makhlouf was singled out above the rest, and at
139 For a full list of regime members (but somewhat outdated) see: Revolution intelligence System. “Syrian Re-
gime ماظنلا ناكرأ.” Revolution Intelligence System, 2011. http://www.revolutionintelligence.com/pillarsofregime. 
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the very beginning of the uprising the offices of Syriatel were burned down.145
After  Rami  Makhlouf  angered  Bashar  al-Asad  with  comments  made  in  an
interview in the New York Times146 he was publicly sacrificed and declared he
would withdraw from business and focus solely on charitable work.147 Many
within the opposition were doubtful of the true intent behind these statements.
Firas Tlass defected – as did Manaf and many others within the family – and has
since declared that he supports the uprising financially.148 
It  should be made clear  that  the strict  boundaries drawn here between
these various groups are ideal types, and that in reality these differences are not
as stark. The first and second “inner circles”, in combination with the economic
elite, form an unified whole, an elite group that commands politics, the armed
forces  and  the  economy.  It  should  also  note  that  members  of  parliament,
diplomats and cabinet ministers do not feature as specific groups. This mirrors
an empirical reality as political power is not embodied within the legislative
bodies, but the executive (security). 
Actors in transition: Civil society
Here  the  most  important  actors  in  society  are  discussed,  using  the  same
structure as above. I start with actors that were present before the uprising and
then move on to discuss those that emerged during the uprising.
The “Damascus Declaration” Opposition
This is embodied by those opposition parties, groups and individuals that signed
the October 2005 “Damascus declaration” calling for the “establishment of a
democratic  national  regime” as the  basic  approach to  political  reform. They
stated that this reform had to be “peaceful,  gradual,  founded on accord, and
based  on  dialogue”.149 The  signatories  included  a  few  Kurdish  parties  (see
below)  in  addition  to  the  Committees  for  the  Revival  of  Civil  Society,  an
organization that emerged from the 2001 “Damascus Spring” period. In addition
a number of “elite opposition figures” signed the petition: Riad Saif (former MP
and businessman and founder of the Forum for National Dialogue), Michel Kilo
(Christian and longtime opposition figure and publicist), Jawdat Said (Shaykh
and Islamic scholar  form Quneitra near the Golan Heights) and Haitham al-
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Maleh (former Judge and Islamist-leaning Human Rights activist).150 Most of
these names and organizations have played a role – albeit not a pivotal one – in
the uprising. Haitham al-Maleh was one of the first to attempt to establish a
foreign council to represent the Syrian uprising – but failed. Riad Saif became a
senior member of the National Coalition in November 2012. They are seen to be
the traditional elite opposition but their position in a future Syria is uncertain.
Kurdish Opposition Parties
The Kurdish region has traditionally been one of the most politicized in Syria –
as a consequence there are numerous parties and movements. A few examples
of Kurdish parties are the Kurdish Future Movement of Mashaal Tammo and
the  Democratic  Union  Party  (PYD,  which  has  close  connections  with  the
Kurdish PKK).151 Many of these parties are at odds with each other over their
relationships with other Kurdish parties in Iraq and/or Turkey, their positions
vis-à-vis the Bashar regime, et cetera. Splits are common: after the assassination
of Mashal Tammo in October 2011152 a leadership crisis developed.153 The PYD
is a strong proponent of far-reaching autonomy for Kurdish Syria. In the context
of the foundation of the Syrian National Council (SNC) in October 2011, the
Kurdish National Council (KNC) was also founded through the direct mediation
of the Kurdish Iraqi president Barzani. With the exception of the PYD, these
parties are in favor of a Kurdish role within a future unified Syria. In July 2012
both groups were reported to have united in the Kurdish Supreme Committee
(KSC). 
Two  related  issues  were  at  the  fore  throughout  the  uprising:  one
concerned the position of Kurds in Syria, and the other the position of Kurds in
the  uprising  against  Bashar.  Immense  differences  exist  between  movements,
parties and regular Kurdish Syrians on both issues. Many Kurdish parties have
hesitated to join the uprising as they see often perceive it to be anti-Kurdish in
its Arab characteristics.154 At the same time, many have not forgiven the fact that
in 2004 – when the Kurds rose up against  Bashar – Arab Syrians remained
silent, leaving Bashar ample opportunity to quell the riots. An exception to the
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rule is the Future Movement led by Mashal Tammo, which has supported the
uprising from the very beginning. The other issue is to what extent Kurds will
push for a federative state after the fall of Bashar al-Asad. To what extent the
KSC can unify the Kurds and settle these issues is still unclear.
The Muslim Brotherhood
As discussed above, the Muslim Brotherhood was exiled in 1982 and since then
has lost most of its infrastructure inside the country. During the leadership of
former general secretary Ali Bayanuni an increasingly pro-democracy and pro-
human rights  discourse  was used in  their  opposition  to  the  regime.  A good
example  of  this  is  the  Muslim  Brotherhood’s  “project  for  a  future  Syria”
published in 2004.155 In 2006 the Muslim Brotherhood initiated the National
Salvation Front (NSF) with former vice-president Abdel Halim Khaddam with
the aim to create a government in exile and destabilize the regime. The project
failed and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood left the group in February 2009.156 
During the uprising the Muslim Brotherhood has struggled to re-emerge
as  a  (or  the  most)  relevant  opposition  group.  Although  it  remains  the  only
Islamist political party with a history in Syrian politics, it has not been able to
recreate a structure inside the country. The Brotherhood has been criticized by
opposition  figures  from all  ideologies  and  backgrounds  for  its  authoritarian
tendencies, especially concerning the Syrian National Council (SNC, see below)
and its dominant position within that organization. With the SNC effectively
replaced by the National Coalition – in which the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood
holds  between  20  and  45  percent  of  seats  –  the  effect  on  internal  Muslim
Brotherhood political strategies remains to be seen.157
Religious Leaders
'Ulama (religious scholars) and Shaykhs (religious leaders) have always held an
important position in Syrian society. 'Ulama such as al-Buti, Jawdat Sa'id and
the late Ahmad Kiftaru are known far beyond the boundaries of the country.
Unsurprisingly  they  have  also  played  an  important  role  in  the  uprising.
Religious leaders (mostly Sufi) with close relationships with the regime – such
as al-Buti, but also Ahmad Badr ad-Din Hassoun (the Mufti of the Republic) –
have  mostly  remained  allied  to  the  regime.  A  prominent  exception  is
Mohammad Habbash (former MP and religious scholar), who decided to defect
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يروسلا,” February 14, 2009. http://www.thisissyria.net/2009/02/14/syriatoday/06.html. 
157 Oweis, Khaled Yacoub. “High Stakes as Syrian Opposition Tries to Form Government | Reuters.” Reuters, 
November 27, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/27/us-syria-crisis-opposition-idUS-
BRE8AQ1CM20121127. 
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in January 2012.158 Other scholars that were traditionally more independently
inclined, such as the Rifai'  brothers (long exiled but returned to Syria in the
early 2000s), Shaykh Nabulsi (a prominent radio shaykh) and Mouaz al-khatib
(former Imam of the main mosque in Damascus) have sided with the uprising. 
These “opposition Shaykhs” have often taken a very active role in the
uprising, with the Rifai' brothers for example apparently using their extensive
contacts in the Gulf to finance and organize secret arms purchases and smuggle
them into the country.159 In this respect one name should be mentioned: Adnan
al-Arour, a Syrian Salafist religious scholar who was exiled from Syria during
the 1980s, and settled in Saudi Arabia. He was the first person to openly and
directly  oppose  Bashar.  Many  accused  Adnan  al-Arour  of  inciting  sectarian
hatred by encouraging a Sunni Islamic uprising against an Alawi (unbelieving)
regime. Support for al-Arour was strongest in the Idlib region, in Homs and
Hama.  In  the  months  between  May  and  November  2011  he  was  the  main
instigator of protests in this region.160 
Local Coordination Committees (LCCs)161
Institutionalized at the neighborhood level, these committees emerged during
the  uprising  due  to  the  practical  need  to  organize  protests  and  gather  and
disseminate  information.162 In  June  2011,  around  100  to  200  people  were
estimated to be fully engaged in these committees.163 Most people active within
these  coordination  committees  are  young  and  have  not  been  involved  in
organized  opposition  activities  before.  They  often  did  not  know each  other
before the start of the uprising and have been “socialized” into forming councils
through their shared experiences in the streets.164 Although committees that were
mostly  Kurdish,  Sunni  or  from  minority  groups  did  emerge,  they  always
attempted to be as inclusive as possible towards all social groups.165 With the
increase in protests in the first months of the uprising, institutionalization also
increased. Despite severe repression the LCCs survived, remained operational
158 All4Syria. “يبد ىلا هؤجلو ” شبح دمحم ” قاقشنا نع تابيرست.” All4Syria.info, January 15, 2012. 
http://all4syria.org/web/archives/46343. 
159 Interviews in the Antakya and Istanbul regions (Turkey) September 2012. 
160 Interviews in Istanbul (Turkey) August 2011. 
161 Shadid, Anthony. “Disparate Factions From Streets Fuel New Opposition in Syria.” The New York Times, 
June 30, 2011, sec. World / Middle East. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/world/middleeast/01syria.html. ; 
Zoepf, Katherine. “Long Repressed, a Syrian Opposition Takes Shape.” The New York Times, April 27, 2011, 
sec. World / Middle East. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/world/middleeast/28syria.html. 
162 See: http://www.lccsyria.org/about Shadid, Anthony. “Disparate Factions From Streets Fuel New Opposition 
in Syria.” The New York Times, June 30, 2011, sec. World / Middle East. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/world/middleeast/01syria.html. ; Zoepf, Katherine. “Long Repressed, a 
Syrian Opposition Takes Shape.” The New York Times, April 27, 2011, sec. World / Middle East. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/world/middleeast/28syria.html. 
163Shadid, Anthony. “Disparate Factions From Streets Fuel New Opposition in Syria.” The New York Times, June
30, 2011, sec. World / Middle East. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/world/middleeast/01syria.html. 
164Leenderrs (unpublished), Interview Alawi from Damascus (Istanbul). 
165 Ibid. 
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and  eventually  succeeded  in  creating  an  umbrella  organization:  the  Local
Coordinating Committees of Syria (LCCS).166
FSA and Popular Militias
As noted above, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) was founded on 29 July 2011 (just
before  the  start  of  Ramadan).167 It  aimed  to  promote  desertions  and  protect
civilians  from  government  repression  by  splitting  the  institutional  structure
between peaceful and armed mobilization.168 In practice the differences between
the  two  were  more  ambiguous,  as  there  were  widespread  incidents  of
spontaneous violence from the start  of the uprising.  With the success of the
Libyan uprising, militias became much more numerous and active throughout
the country. Like the FSA, they were officially formed to “protect the people”
but were often much more offensive in their  tactics  in practice.  At the start
grouped around small cliques tied to family, clan or shaykh, in the following
year  (August  2011  –  July  2012)  they  became  increasingly  organized,  well
trained and unified. Examples of powerful militias are the Liwa al-Tawhid in
Aleppo  and  the  Farouk  Brigade  in  Homs  –  though  new  militias  are  still
constantly formed and/or renamed. These militias pay lip service to the FSA,
but are in reality highly autonomous.
(Jihadi) Salafists
An increasingly important group among the militias – and one that refuses to
fight within the framework of the FSA – is the Jihadists. Though it is hard to
estimate numbers and the spread of these movements, it is clear that members
are lilely to number into the tens of thousands and are probably present in most
parts of the country. They include Arabs from all countries in the region.169 At
the time of writing the most  powerful  Salafist  fighting group appears to  be
Jabhat an-Nusra (Lund 2012), an Al-Qaeda affiliated group that is explicitly not
active under the banner of the FSA or National Coalition.170 Many within the
opposition are wary of the impact Jihadists are making on the image of (and
166 For more information on these organizations (and protests being organized) see their website at http://www.l-
ccsyria.org/en/   .  See also: Shadid, Anthony. “Assad’s Forces Pound City at Center of Syrian Revolt.” The New 
York Times, April 27, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/world/middleeast/28daraa.html. 
167  ,رحلا يروسلا شيجلا ليكشت نلعا2011 . http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=SZcCbIPM37w&feature=youtube_gdata_player. 
168Landis, Joshua. “Free Syrian Army Founded by Seven Officers to Fight the Syrian Army.” Syria Comment, 
July 29, 2011. http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=11043. 
169 Rosen, Nir. “Islamism and the Syrian Uprising.” Foreign Policy, March 8, 2012. http://mideast.foreignpolicy.-
com/posts/2012/03/08/islamism_and_the_syrian_uprising. 
170 Arango, Tim, and Anne Barnard. “Syrian Rebels Tied to Al Qaeda Play Key Role in War.” New York Times, 
December 8, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/09/world/middleeast/syri-
an-rebels-tied-to-al-qaeda-play-key-role-in-war.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0#h[], and see: Syria-Politic. “ ايريس
 - لقتسم يرابخإ يجيتارتسإ يسايس يروس عقوم | كيتيلوب83ةرصنلا ةهبج انلك –يكيرملا لخدتلل ل‘ ةمداقلا ةعمجلا ي امست ةبيتكو ةيقيسنت ’.” 
Http://syria-politic.com, December 9, 2012. http://syria-politic.com/ar/Default.aspx?
subject=1188#.UNBko_n0Hdl. 
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support for) the uprising among foreign nations. At the same time many others
feel they have no other choice but to accept the assistance of these often well
trained fighters. Indeed, as rebel-controlled areas expand and the problems of
administering the occupied territories grow, some are joining Jihadist groups in
protest against the new “corrupt practices” of FSA-related militias.
Syrian National Council and the National Coalition
These are the main opposition bodies abroad, and are attempting to form the
representation of the uprising abroad. As mentioned before, early attempts were
marred by old rifts within the Syrian opposition. Many of the initiatives never
took off until the Syrian National Council (SNC) was formed.171 The Council
initially  found wide  support  from Syrians  inside  the  country,  but  a  struggle
lingered  over  whether  a  future  Syria  should  be  named  an  “Arab”  republic
(which the Kurds opposed). Allegations of corruption and authoritarianism soon
surfaced  and  its  legitimacy  in-  and  outside  Syria  gradually  decreased.
Increasingly the SNC came under the domination of the Muslim Brotherhood,
which used the body as a tool to fund various opposition militias inside the
country. This all continued until a new initiative began in November 2012, the
National Coalition (NC, headed by the previously mentioned Syrian Shaykh and
activist Mouaz al-Khatib), which took over the central role of representing the
domestic Syrian uprising abroad.172 All groups (including the Kurdish National
Council) are part of this new coalition.
Syrian Labor movements and Student Movements
Finally, two groups that are often at the forefront of collective mobilization have
remained largely absent from, or have played only a minor role in, the Syrian
uprising.  The  first  are  the  Syrian  Labor  movements. Due  to  the  historical
development  of  labor  unions  (unions  in  the  Syrian  periphery  emerged  as
corporate  Ba'athist  structures  in  the  1960s)  the  Syrian  regime  was  able  to
effectively pacify unionism in the country. After the 1979-82 uprising, even the
urban labor  unions  (those  that  predated  Ba'athist  rule)  were  co-opted  into a
national  Ba'athist  organization and rendered ineffective as  regime opposition
groups  (Raymond  A.  Hinnebusch  1993).  The  historically  close  relations
between rural labor movements and the Ba'ath regime can be seen as one of the
main causes for their current quiescence: at both local and national levels labor
organizations have been effectively tied to the regime. In previous episodes of
mobilization, as in the current uprising, they played no significant role.173 The
171 France 24. “ايكرت نم ’ينطولا سلجملا‘ ليكشت نلعت ةضراعملاو تاجاجتحلا نم رهشأ ةتس.” France 24, September 15, 2011. 
http://www.france24.com/ar/20110915-syria-opposition-six-months-demonstrations-national-council-turkey.  
172 Gladstone, Rick. “As Syria Opposition Unifies, Unrest Intensifies at Borders.” New York Times, November 
12, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/13/world/middleeast/syria-war-updates.html. 
173 See the website of the national Syrian union: http://wu-sy.org/c/ 
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same holds for organized politicized student movements. They are largely absent
in Syria as their institutional structures, together with general unionism in the
country,  have  historically  been  effectively  co-opted  into  Ba'athist  structures.
This does not mean, that students have not been active, or that universities have
not been a breeding ground for  mobilization:  university  dorms have became
infamous as centers of mobilization.174 As the uprising emerged, specific student
coordination committees emerged at various universities. But these groups did
not build on pre-existing organizational structures or collective identities. 
Conclusion 
The  report  provided  a  general  overview  of  the  historical  and  structural
background of the Syrian uprising which started in March 2011 and is ongoing
at the time of writing (November 2012). In the preceding pages I have explored
the  structural  characteristics  of  the  Syrian  political  regime  and  society,
discussed the resulting (political) opportunities for social mobilization, provided
an  overview  of  key  actors,  and  an  initial  overview  of  the  protests  and
transformative events that took place throughout the period. I hope it is clear
that Syria’s particular structural conditions – its sectarian social composition,
regional embeddedness and the military-security character of its political regime
have been crucial to how the uprising developed.  Second, I hope the report
showed  that  “political  opportunity  structures”  (as  traditionally  defined)
remained stable and closed throughout the uprising. Instead, cognitive “shocks”
from  fellow  Arab  countries  were  important  influences  on  the  perceived
opportunities  and  threats  among  protesters,  thereby  influencing  subsequent
mobilization dynamics.
What the future holds for Syria remains unknown, but many are fearful.
The fear of a sectarian backlash that will strengthen the regime is growing. With
rebel forces proving more powerful by the week, a regime victory (as in 1982)
and a return to a pre-2011 situation is highly unlikely. At the same time a sudden
regime collapse, though possible, is also unlikely. A gradual retreat from various
areas is far more likely. More chaos, more destruction, and more deaths will be
the result until the regime falls. With Syria’s state institutions shattered and its
social  fabric  both  uprooted  and  polarized,  and  radical  Jihadists  groups
increasingly  strong,  every  passing  day  makes  a  post-Bashar  civil  war  more
likely. 
174 France 24. “  ةلاحإ400 سنارف - ايروس - ’ةلودلا سيئر ريقحتو بغشلا ‘ ةمهتب ءاضقلا مامأ بلح ةعماج نم بلاط 24 ولراك تنوم - 
ةيلودلا,” June 27, 2011. http://www.france24.com/ar/20110627-syria-justice-trial-students-accused-demonstraters-
kurdish-human-right-statment-critic-against-alassad.  
———. “  سنارف - ايروس - عمقلاو فنعلا لامعأ نيدت سيرابو قشمد ةعماج يف ايبلط اعمجت قرفي نملا24ةيلودلا ولراك تنوم - ,” April 
11, 2011. http://www.france24.com/ar/20110411-syria-damascus-university-arrest-demonstrations-paris-con-
demns.   
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Appendix B: Abbreviations 
Hamas – Harakat al-muqawama al-Islamia (The Islamic Resistance Movement).
KNC – Kurdish National Council.
KSC – Kurdish Supreme Committee.
LCCs – Local Coordination Committees. 
LCCS – The Local Coordination Committees in Syria (umbrella organization). 
MP – Member of Parliament. 
NC – National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. 
PFLP-GC – Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command. 
PKK – Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, (Kurdistan Workers' Party). 
PLO – Palestinian Liberalization Organization.
PYD – Democratic Union Party.
SNC – Syrian National Council.
NC – National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, or
National Council. 
NSF – National Salvation Front. 
UNSC – United Nations Security Council.
Appendix C: Table of selected protests 2000 – 2012 
The table below notes the main protest events in the period under review. It aims to provide a general overview of the crucial
protests and a possible starting point for a more representative (and thorough) event analysis of Syrian protests during this period.
Cells left blank indicate irrelevance or a lackof information. 
0 1 2 3 Date/duration Name Cities Aim # protesters Forms/repertoires Actors organizing 
26 September 
2000i
Declaration of the 
99ii
Damascusiii Political Liberalization 
and end of emergency 
lawiv
99 signatoriesv Petitionvi Prominent Establishment 
Figuresvii
15 January 
2001viii
Declaration of the 
1000ix
Damascusx End of emergency law and
Democratizationxi
(+/-) 1000 
signatories. 
Probably fewer.xii
Petitionxiii Prominent Establishment 
Figures, “Friends of Civil 
society” عمتجملا ءايحإ ناجلل
يندملا xiv
8 March 2004xv Sit-in in front of 
parliamentxvi
Damascusxvii End Emergency Lawsxviii A Hundredxix Sit-inxx the committee in charge of 
democratic freedoms and 
human rights in Syria 
(umbrella Organization) xxi
March 2004 xxii Kurdish uprisingxxiii Qamishli, Kurdish 
Region.xxiv Also Aleppo 
and Damascusxxv
Minority Rights, Political 
Liberalization.xxvi
Thousands.xxvii Protest marches, 
stone throwingxxviii
October 2005xxix Damascus 
Declarationxxx
Damascus.xxxi Political Liberalizationxxxii Declaration, press 
statementsxxxiii
A variety of Syrian political
movementsxxxiv
July 2008 xxxv Sadnaya uprisingxxxvi Sadnaya (prison, very 
localized)xxxvii
Better prison 
environmentxxxviii
Dozens/Hundred
?xxxix
Hostage taking, 
killing, press 
statementsxl
(Salafi) prisonersxli
11 March 
2011xlii
First Dara' 
Protestsxliii
Dara'xliv Freeing prisonersxlv A few hundreds 
at most.xlvi 
Street protestsxlvii Family/Clan based.'xlviii
18 March 
2011xlix
1st National “Friday
of Rage”l
Dara', Banias, Homs, 
Damascusli 
Against repressionlii 
Economic corruption and 
clientelism.liii 
From several 
Hundredliv to 3 to 
4 thousand.lv In 
Damascus around
150.lvi 
Street protestslvii “Spontaneously” formed 
council of 80-odd people 
form Daralviii
18-29 March 
2011lix
The 1st week of 
protestslx
Dara', Damascus 
Qunaeitralxi Latakya.lxii 
The abolition of Syria’s 
48-year emergency law; 
more freedoms; and an 
end to pervasive 
corruption..lxiii
Thousandslxiv to 
tens of 
thousands.lxv
Peaceful street 
protests, Arson 
attempts to police, 
party buildings.lxvi In 
Dara': encampments 
attempts mosquelxvii
Locally formed groups.lxviii
29 March → 
Todaylxix
Every Fridaylxx Whole country (see 
report)
Regime Change, every 
Friday special “theme”lxxi
Between 
hundreds to 
hundreds of 
thousandslxxii
Peaceful street 
protests
LCCslxxiii
3 June 2011lxxiv “Hamza al-Khatib” 
Protestslxxv
Throughout the country,
Dara' less: too much 
repression.lxxvi
Regime Change, as 
reaction to torture 13-year 
old Hamza Khatib.lxxvii
70,000 in Maarrat
an Numan and 
50,000 in 
Arihalxxviii
Peaceful street 
protestslxxix
LCCslxxx
6 June 2011lxxxi Jisr al-Shoughour 
“Arrmy mass-
defection”lxxxii
Jisr al-Shoughourlxxxiii Refusal to shoot civilians, 
in combination with low 
living standardslxxxiv
Hundreds? Attacking army and 
police stationslxxxv 
explosive trapslxxxvi
 
22 July 
2011lxxxvii
Protests in 
“liberated” 
citieslxxxviii
Dara', Homs, Hama, 
Deir ez-Zour.lxxxix
Regime change, against 
sectarianism.xc
Hundreds of 
Thousands.xci
Mass Peaceful street 
protests.xcii
LCCs.xciii
25 May 2012xciv Houwlah 
Massacre.xcv
Houwlah.xcvi Sectarian hatred.xcvii Unknown. Civilian 
Massacre.xcviii
Possible Shabiha.xcix
12 July 2012c Tremseh Massacre.ci Tremseh.cii Possibly Army attack 
against FSA / Militias.ciii
Unknown. Civilian Massacre.civ Syrian Army, possibly in an
action against 
FSA/militias.cv
18 July 2012cvi Bomb attack on elite
security and military
individuals.cvii
Damascus.cviii Regime change.cix Unknown. Bomb attack (either 
suicide or remotely 
detonated).cx
Ansar Islam (Jihadists) / 
FSA.cxi
10 Aprilcxii - 
June 2012cxiii
Kofi Annan Peace 
plan & observerscxiv
Damascus, whole 
countrycxv
N/a Hundreds of 
observerscxvi
N/a Arab league (?), 
subsequently UN.cxvii
May, June 
August 2012cxviii
Lebanon 
infighting.cxix 
Tripoli (Lebanon), 
Beirut.cxx
Sectarian: support or 
against Syrian Uprising.cxxi
Hundreds? Violence, Small 
arms.cxxii
June 2011 and 
(more extreme) 
April 2012cxxiii
Palestinian 
infightingcxxiv
Damascus: Yarmoukcxxv Intra-Palestinian:
support or against Syrian 
Uprisingcxxvi
Hundreds? Any type of violent 
mean at disposalcxxvii
GFLP-GC against other 
Palestinian factions (Hamas
already left)cxxviii
i(Ghadbian 2001, 636) 
ii Ibid.  
iii Ibid. 
iv Ibid.  
v Ibid. 
vi (Landis and Pace 2007)
vii Ibid. 
viii“راــــــبخأ ,ةيجراخ فحص ىلإ نييروسلا نيفقثملا ةقيثو بيرستب انئجوف :«طسولا قرشلا» ـل وليك لاشيم”, January 16, 2001. 
http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&iss  ueno=8085&article=21803&search=%D3%E6%D1%ED
%C7&state=true. 
ix Ibid. 
x Ibid. 
xi Ibid. 
xiiراــــــبخأ ,ةيجراخ فحص ىلإ نييروسلا نيفقثملا ةقيثو بيرستب انئجوف :«طسولا قرشلا» ـل وليك لاشيم”, January 16, 2001. 
http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=8085&article=21803&search=%D3%E6%D1%ED
%C7&state=true. 
xiii Ibid. 
xiv (Ghadbian 2001, 636); راــــــبخأ ,ةيجراخ فحص ىلإ نييروسلا نيفقثملا ةقيثو بيرستب انئجوف :«طسولا قرشلا» ـل وليك لاشيم”, January 
16, 2001. http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=8085&article=21803&search=%D3%E6%D1%ED
%C7&state=true. 
xvArabic News. “Damascus: Demonstrators Detained Before the Syrian Parliament”, March 9, 2004. http://www.arab-
icnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/040309/2004030903.html. 
xvi Ibid. 
xvii Ibid. 
xviii Ibid. 
xix Ibid. 
xx Ibid. 
xxi (Landis and Pace 2007)
xxii KurdWatch. Who Is the Syrian-Kurdish Opposition? European Center for Kurdish Studies, December 1, 2011. 
xxiii Ibid.
xxiv Ibid.  
xxv“  حارس قلطإ70يلشماقلاب بغشلا ثداوح يف نيلقتعملا نم ايروس ايدرك راــــــبخأ ,قشمدو بلحو ”  , June 3, 2004.  http://www.aawsat.-
com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=9319&article=237429&search=%D3%E6%D1%ED%C7&state=true  ; Razuq al-
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